Problems of COMMUNISM

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Czechoslovakia's "Parties"

EDWARD TABORSKY

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Khrushchev at the Helm: II

EDITORS' NOTE: Continuing this journal's survey of the major policies instituted under Khrushchev's reign, we present in this issue three articles bearing on the 21st Congress of the CPSU, convened in Moscow between January 27 and February 5 of this year. The first full-scale party gathering to be held since the dramatic "anti-Stalinist" congress of 1956, the 21st Congress presented the world not only with a balance sheet of Soviet achievements and failures of the last six years, but also with a blueprint for the years ahead; it is with this historical record and the projected trends for the future that Mr. Bialer's article is concerned. The second article, by Mr. Leon Herman, focusses specifically on the new seven-year economic plan, which was easily the most important item on the congress' agenda. Finally, in "Socialist Legality: the Mountain Has Labored," Mr. Lipson discusses the import of statements at the congress relating to Soviet law against the background of recent significant changes in the Soviet legal system, formally adopted at the December session of the Supreme Soviet.

The 21st Congress and Soviet Policy

By Seweryn Bialer

ACCORDING TO THE CPSU constitution, party congresses are to be held every four years. Why, then, did Khrushchev find it necessary to convene an "extraordinary congress" only three years after the spectacular 20th Congress?

The formal reason for this step was to have the party congress confirm Khrushchev's annulment in 1957 of the sixth five-year plan approved at the 20th Party Congress, and at the same time endorse Khrushchev's new Seven-Year Plan. Under party statutes, the approval of long-range plans for the development of the Soviet economy is a prerogative granted to party congresses. It is not sufficient to have such plans confirmed by the Supreme Soviet or, for that matter, by the Central Committee of the party.

It seems unlikely, however, that this deference to protocol was the sole or even the chief reason for convening the "extraordinary" 21st Congress. After all, such a meeting involves immense organizational effort, considerable costs, the interruption of normal party and government work, and the removal for many days from their practical activities of the leading party members both in the Soviet Union and abroad. Such burdens are not assumed lightly or for formal reasons alone. Indeed, Mikoyan hinted as much when he told the delegates that Khrushchev's report "is far more than a mere exposition of the tasks of the seven-year national economic plan, and indeed all the work of our Congress takes on far more domestic and international significance than a statement of the control figures of the plan implies."[1] An

Mr. Bialer is a former high functionary of the Polish CP who now makes his residence in the United States. His first contribution to this magazine, "Moscow vs. Belgrade: A Key to Soviet Policy," appeared in issue No. 4 (July-August), 1958.

[1] *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1959.

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analysis of the proceedings of the Congress and the circumstances under which it was held suggests at least four unofficial but compelling reasons for holding the "extraordinary" session.

Leadership Motive

To begin with, the 21st Congress served as the setting for a *huge propaganda effort to demonstrate the might of the Soviet Union to both friends and enemies throughout the world.* Since the previous congress in 1956, an important shift in the international balance of power has taken place to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the 21st Congress did everything possible to underscore the enormously increased military power of the USSR. (In this connection, it is hardly accidental that this propaganda campaign should coincide with the Soviet's testing of Western strength and unity through Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin.) In addition, the Congress made much of Soviet *economic* superiority—to be achieved, according to monotonously repeated claims, in the not-too-distant future. The combination of military and economic superiority was used as an argument of great political strength, intended to intimidate the West and to evoke both admiration and fear in economically underdeveloped countries.

A second reason for convening the "extraordinary" session was to provide *an occasion for a conference of international communism.* There seems little doubt that behind the scenes of the official party Congress, another unofficial conference of Communist leaders from five continents took place. How else explain the fact that both the number of foreign Communist parties and the number of foreign delegates present at this congress surpassed those of any previous Soviet party congress and indeed of any previous international Communist conference? At the 20th Party Congress, 56 foreign Communist parties were represented; at the 1957 international Communist conference in Moscow, delegates from 47 parties were on hand. In contrast, the 21st Congress saw the presence of 72 foreign party delegations, and the number of foreign speakers nearly equalled that of Soviet speakers. It is not likely that this unprecedented turnout was intended for show purposes only. Although there is no mention of international Communist deliberations in the official materials of the Congress, we shall probably learn about them later on from semi-official and unofficial sources, as in the case of the 20th Congress.

Certainly world Communist developments between these two meetings were profound and stormy enough to warrant a re-evaluation of ideological and organizational problems. It is true that the Moscow conference in November 1957 took important steps toward the elimination of revisionist tendencies and the restoration of unity of action within world communism. But all of these steps were primarily defensive, whereas the new task facing the international delegations at the 21st Congress was to outline a long-range *offensive* program to correlate with the new aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy.

Thirdly, from the standpoint of internal party politics, the 21st Congress provided *an impressive demonstration of Khrushchev's personal authority.* For the first time, and unanimously, he was hailed as the "ideologist" and the "theoretician" of the party. These titles, along with the inevitable praise of Khrushchev by almost every speaker, symbolized officially the end of the current phase of the struggle for leadership within the Soviet party and government. Khrushchev's primacy now is significantly different from his primacy in 1956. Before the 20th Congress took place he had already removed his two principal competitors, Malenkov and Molotov, from the central positions they held in the party and government. But even then they, along with other members of the presidium, still commanded important and independent forces within the Soviet hierarchy. Khrushchev's leadership was still an authority by agreement, by arrangement, by consent, and not an authority wielded by reason of absolute strength.

At the present moment, Khrushchev leads from strength, and the struggle within the Soviet leadership is no longer for his removal or his degradation, but primarily for his favors and for influence on his decisions. The competition for his favors is not accompanied by the kind of servile, nauseating flattery that the world became accustomed to during Stalin's reign. None of the speakers at the congress ended his oration with an ecstatic "Long live our leader, Comrade Khrushchev!" No one compared the bald Khrushchev to the sun, as was the case with the mustached Stalin. Yet if no superhuman qualities were attributed to Khrushchev (who himself, significantly enough, did not once mention the words "collective leadership" in his two addresses), his position as the new leader was nonetheless made abundantly clear. The most grotesque features of the "cult of personality" have disappeared—perhaps forever; what we now have is a new cult, more in keeping with the moderate and "rational" temper of Soviet politics in general. It is a cult of a leader whose authority is nearly absolute, whose power—at least for the time being—is unchallenged, and whose decisions are presented to the populace only for the purpose of "unanimous" and "fervent" approval. (See the box on pp. 4-5—Ed.)

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Finally, beyond the formal endorsement of Khrushchev's new seven-year economic plan, the 21st Congress serves the purpose of *"internal mobilization" within the Soviet Union itself*. Khrushchev recognized that just as this was an auspicious moment for reaping world-wide propaganda profits from recent Soviet achievements, so too was it well-timed for stimulating widespread popular enthusiasm and support for his ambitious domestic program. Recent Soviet attainments in the military area, the impressive successes in conquering outer space, the considerable achievements in agricultural development—as well as the expectation of a good harvest in the current year—all created a favorable atmosphere for launching the seven-year plan. Thus the old motto of "catching up with and surpassing the United States" was given a new realistic flavor and was made the axis around which the activity of the Soviet population in all spheres would resolve.

These four unofficial aims help to explain the timing of the "extraordinary" Congress. As important as the motives behind its convocation, however, are the broad tendencies of Soviet policy which its proceedings helped to illuminate. These can be broken down most usefully into the categories of economic policy, the ideological line, the policy within international communism, and foreign policy.

Economic Developments

In the fields of industry and agriculture, the Congress continued and considerably sharpened certain trends which had been sketched out somewhat more timidly at its predecessor. The period between the two meetings had witnessed important moves toward reorganizing and decentralizing Soviet industry, and, in agriculture, toward increasing the autonomy and prerogatives of the kolkhozes. The meaning of these developments was concisely put by Mikoyan in his speech at the Congress:

We shall be changing not only the character and conditions of production; corresponding changes will take place at the same time in our production relations . . . relative to the changes in productive forces.[2]

It is safe to assume that by "production relations," Mikoyan meant the economic interaction between the state and the units of production. Here indeed an important development toward greater flexibility has been taking place since Stalin's death. This new flexibility was a reaction against the increasing prodigality and wastefulness of industrial development under Stalin. It should be recalled that the same rigid principles of centralized control and the same forms of organization that were devised for the industrially backward Soviet Union of the first five-year plan were still in force for the powerful Soviet industry of the early 1950's. In agriculture, the old forms and principles led not only to tremendous wastefulness but to stagnation and even regression. It has become clear that the key to solving or at least mitigating the economic crisis lies not in the field of technology but in changing what Mikoyan referred to as "the production relations" between the state and the producing unit.

Just before his death Stalin himself sought a way out of the crisis in agriculture—a crisis he did not, however, acknowledge officially. In his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," prepared for the 1952 Party Congress, Stalin outlined a plan for further limiting *kolkhoz* autonomy, and for increasing state control to the extent of introducing into agriculture the same principles which then prevailed in state industry. In contrast to Stalin's attempt to escape from the effects of irrationality by plunging upon a course which could only aggravate them, Khrushchev's efforts have turned in the direction of economic rationalism. His program, given official "approval" at the 21st Congress, aims at decreasing state administrative interference in the *kolkhoz* system (through liquidation of the machine tractor stations, for example) and curbing the financial drain on the *kolkhoz* economy that went along with bureaucratic control.

Khrushchev's agricultural policies have had marked effects on agricultural production. In the hitherto exceptionally backward area of livestock production, for example, the quantity of cattle in 1958 increased over the 1953 figure by 24 percent, the quantity of cows by 28 percent, pigs by 41 percent and sheep by 29 percent. Nothing in the deliberations of the congress indicated that the policy which has engendered these successes will be reversed.

The Congress indirectly but perhaps even more dramatically reflected the impact of Khrushchev's reorganization of Soviet industry in the direction of decentralization. Of the list of delegates in attendance, almost two-thirds were newcomers who had not been present at the previous Congress; since delegates selected for the gatherings—aside from top leaders, exemplary milkers and heroic Stakhanovites—are primarily economic activists of the middle and higher levels, these figures offer a striking picture of industrial personnel shifts during the past three years, probably involving the promotion, demotion, or transfer of managerial workers. That these changes will continue was indicated by Khrushchev's demand at the 21st Congress for the dis-

[2] *Ibid.*

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missal of "weak people who cannot cope with the job entrusted to them." Affirming his reliance on youthful infusions, the Soviet leader added:

In our midst it is frequently thought that a person of 35 or 40 is not yet mature enough for leading posts. This is wrong . . . Such people must be given an opportunity to reveal their abilities in practical work.[3]

The Ideological Line

Just as Stalin's death brought a "thaw" in the economic and political spheres of Soviet society, so did the 20th Congress initiate a "thaw" in the ideological field. But while the economic and political "thaw" was the result of a deliberate policy of the party leadership, the ideological "thaw" was an unintended by-product of the line adopted by the 1956 Congress. The ensuing phase of ideological relaxation frightened the leadership of the party, and in the fall of that year it launched a determined and apparently successful fight to restore the "sacredness" of the official doctrine.

The fact that changes in certain formulations of official party ideology have been introduced by Khrushchev should not mislead us. Even while Stalin was alive, official theses were changed from time to time, including those formulated by Stalin himself. Khrushchev too has had to revise his own formulations in order to justify past and current policy shifts, especially in Soviet eco-

[3] *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1959.

Le roi est mort...

Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in party work and in economic activity; it brought about a rude violation of internal party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, the covering up of shortcomings and the varnishing of reality. Our nation gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit. . . . Comrades! We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all.

—From Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the 20th CPSU Congress, Feb. 25, 1956.

* * *

From speeches at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, January 27-February 5, 1959:

N. S. Khrushchev's report to the present congress constitutes a new, great contribution to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. It gives a profound and comprehensive analysis of the tremendous constructive work which has been done in the country . . . since the 20th Party Congress. . . . [It] fills the heart of every Soviet man with a sense of joy and pride.—*V. Semichastnyi, Secretary of the CC of the Komsomol.*

I should like to suggest that much of what has been achieved along the path shown by the great Lenin is the result of the unflagging initiative and personal example of Comrade Khrushchev, his profound practical knowledge, his ability to fuse creatively the practical demands of life and theory, and his close ties with the broad working masses. (Applause)—*E. I. Andreyeva, Chairman of the Komintern collective farm, Tambov oblast.*

We owe the successes in building and launching artificial earth satellites and cosmic rockets, above all, to the Presidium of our party's Central Committee and to Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev personally, who exercises constant leadership over the activities conducted in this direction. (Applause)—*D. F. Ustinov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.*

The theses of Comrade Khrushchev's report . . . point a clear road for biology.—*A. N. Nesmeyanov, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences.*

Comrade N. S. Khrushchev drew the attention of hydrobuilders, scientists, engineers, draftsmen and workers to the need to make the building of the electric power plants less costly. . . . In order to fulfill the tremendous task linked with the building of electric power plants and power lines, we must in the very near future implement the advice and instructions of Comrade Khrushchev.—*I. T. Novikov, USSR Minister, Construction of Power Stations.*

Now, as is known, we have already set about the fulfillment of the program for the accelerated development of the chemical industry, worked out on the initiative of N. S. Khrushchev.—*L. J. Brezhnev, Secretary of the CC of the CPSU.*

The questions relating to the reorganization of education raised at Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's initiative are a new striking manifestation of the Leninist, attentive, keen, and careful approach to the needs, desires, and peculiarities of each nation.—*I. R. Razzakov, First Secretary of the CC of the Kirgiz CP.*

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nomic life. The important point is that such revisions can only come from the top; only the party leadership is permitted to interpret ideology, and any unauthorized discussion of party dogma is forbidden. In this sense, the 21st Party Congress further underlines a rigidity in doctrinal matters only slightly less marked than that of the Stalin era.

The Congress particularly revealed the sharp distinction made between the democratization of everyday existence and democratization in the field of ideology. It is now permissible to criticize bureaucratic control in economic life and to urge restrictions on the activities of the secret police. But no sanction is given to free expression of critical opinion in the social and political sciences, literature, art, or philosophy. At last December's plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Khrushchev praised the progress made in democratizing economic life and then with the same zeal proceeded, Zhdanov-style, to dissolve the board of editors of the leading Soviet magazine in the field of botany for daring to criticize the "learning" of Academician Lysenko.

With the experiences of 1956 still freshly in mind, the present Soviet leadership is trying to rationalize and partially democratize daily life while avoiding changes or shocks in the area of ideology. The rise of intellectual revisionism in 1956 was not occasioned so much by Khrushchev's political-economic reforms as by his ideological "carelessness" (*e.g.* the secret speech at the 20th Party Congress.) The present policy is to reverse that carelessness by making it unmistakably clear that

. . . *Vive le roi?*

I consider it my duty to state that thanks to the daily solicitude of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and Nikita Sergeyevich personally, our armed forces fully meet present-day military requirements. . .—*Marshal K. Malinovsky, Minister of Defense.*

You know full well, comrades, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its Presidium, and Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally pay exceptional attention daily to foreign political problems, and concretely guide our foreign policy.—*A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister.*

The problem of training universally-developed and well-prepared builders of a Communist society . . . was raised by Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and was worked out under his personal leadership. . . . Life showed . . . the correctness of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's proposals relating to the reorganization of management in industry and construction. (Applause)—*I. I. Kuzmin, Chairman of the USSR Gosplan.*

The working people of Turkmenistan thank profoundly, from the very bottom of their hearts, the Leninist Central Committee and the CPSU CC Presidium, the Soviet Government, and Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev personally, for truly fatherly solicitude for the flourishing of the Turkmen people and for the implementation of their age-old dream.—*D. D. Karayev, First Secretary of the CC of the Turkmen CP.*

. . . within a short time Comrade N. S. Khrushchev twice visited our republic and gave us much useful advice concerning the development of the economy and culture of the republic. Just for the fact alone that the further upsurge of cotton-growing has been insured in our country, we can thank mainly the indefatigable activity of the Presidium of the CC and Comrade N. S. Khrushchev personally. (Applause)—*T. Uldzhabayev, First Secretary of the CC of the Tadzhik CP.*

We must say quite plainly, comrades, that in the great political, theoretical, and organization work that has been carried out in all spheres by our Leninist Central Committee, beginning with the solution of the most complex and urgent international questions, the consistent struggle for the cause of peace, for the prevention of war, the solution of the most important questions of the development of agriculture, the collective farm system, the reorganization of the management of industry and construction, and ending with questions of science, literature and arts, the questions of enhancing links between school and life, the outstanding role belongs to the initiative, the rich political experience and tireless energy of Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. (Stormy applause)—*P. N. Pospelov, Secretary of the Presidium of the CPSU.*

* * *

. . . nobody will forget the tremendous services and labors of the indomitable Leninist—the First Secretary of the Central Committee, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev—in re-establishing the Leninist collective leadership of the country. . . .

—**A. Koluschinsky, First Secretary of the Omsk Oblast.**

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ideological tenets are no longer subject to public questioning and criticism. Occasional incidents which contradict this taboo are not the result of party policy but of spontaneous — and *human* — tendencies militating against it.

Soviet Policy and International Communism

Following the 20th Congress, the international Communist movement entered a period of disorganization, during which strong centrifugal forces came into play. Moscow's main efforts in this area between 1956 and 1959 have been directed toward overcoming those forces and consolidating world communism under Soviet leadership.

In estimating the degree of consolidation achieved at the time of the 21st Congress, one must differentiate between the organizational and the political ties of international communism with Moscow. Organizationally, the ties are much weaker than they were during Stalin's reign or even before the 20th Congress. Communist parties abroad, both in the East and the West, are more independent than ever in conducting their activities and making intra-party decisions. They are no longer treated as agencies of the Soviet state, and Moscow shows no signs of re-imposing the Stalinist pattern of domination.

On the other hand, it is safe to assume that the political ties of foreign Communist parties with Moscow are stronger now than at any time since Stalin's death. This situation arises not so much from Soviet pressure as from the present constellation of international affairs. There has always been an interdependence between Soviet foreign policy and the activities of foreign Communist parties. Local Communist action opens the way for Soviet penetration and, conversely, Soviet penetration encourages the activities of the local parties. At the moment, the second phase of this interdependence has come to the foreground.

The pattern of united Soviet and local Communist policy has shifted its center of emphasis in recent years from the capitalist countries of the West to the economically underprivileged countries. Writing in *Kommunist* on "The International Communist Movement at the New Stage," B. Ponomarev, an old member of the Comintern and now a department chief in the Soviet Central Committee apparatus, has declared:

> **New sites of revolutionary movement are being created all the time. If in some old capitalist countries—the so-called classical capitalist countries—the bourgeoisie and their right-wing socialist accomplices succeed for the time-being in deceiving a part of the working people, then in other countries, particularly in the countries of the East, Latin America, and in some European countries, the labor movement distinguishes itself by its militant character and solidarity; it displays examples of Marxist-Leninist vigor and is rising.[4]**

And as if to underscore Moscow's concern not only with the encouragement of nationalist movements in underdeveloped countries, but also with the "leading role" (*i.e.*, dominant position) to be assumed by local Communist parties, in order—to use Communist terminology —to "transform the national bourgeois revolution into a new higher stage," the article adds:

> **The progressive forces of these countries draw inspiration for their struggle from the treasure-house of socialist ideology. This advanced ideology promotes the growth of the self-consciousness of the popular masses; it opens *operative perspectives* (*operatyvnyie perspektivy*) for the liberation not only from the foreign yoke but also from social slavery; it works out paths of development that respond to the aspirations of the liberated peoples, the path of building a new life. [Italics added.]**

What the author has in mind is apparent from a further passage:

> **The Communist parties alone are showing the popular masses the right way in the struggle for freedom, peace, and social progress. The Communist parties alone remain true to the cause of the workers. The Communist Party, even when small, plays an important and progressive role, for it gives the proper orientation to the working class, helps it to understand complicated events and to recognize the political intentions of one or another political grouping . . .**

This line was re-echoed at the 21st Congress, where international political problems were discussed in revolutionary terms *only when they concerned underdeveloped countries*. In contrast, the problems of "classical capitalist" countries were discussed almost exclusively on the level of Soviet state policy. This new stress on the revolutionary aspect of Communist policy in underdeveloped areas is a distinctly new feature of the party line, totally absent from earlier pronouncements such as those made at the 20th Congress.

Foreign Policy

Some of the developments in Soviet foreign policy between the 20th and the 21st Congresses seem clear enough. There has been increased activity of an expansionist nature, with a multiplication of the number of incendiary spots created or exploited by the USSR. Three years ago the Soviet offensive in Asia concentrated mainly on India, whereas it now has spread over several other Asian countries. The offensive in the

[4] *Kommunist* No. 15, October 1958.

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Middle East has become more intense. New centers of Soviet attention are Africa and South America.

As far as tactics go, Soviet foreign policy has, since 1956, returned more and more frequently to the old Stalinist devices of frontal assault, provocation, blackmail, intimidation (*e.g.*, with regard to such areas as Finland, Turkey, and Berlin.) But at the same time Moscow has continued such post-Stalinist tactics as the exploitation of so-called "positive neutrality" and the "peace" assault under the banner of coexistence.

Yet with all this said, the immediate goal of present Soviet foreign policy is not easy to formulate clearly. In fact, in looking at the three years which have elapsed since the 20th Congress, one detects a certain confusion and vacillation in Kremlin thinking. There are indications of frequent changes, of plans not worked out to the end, of experimentation and the existence of unresolved doubts and differences on the highest levels. The key to unanswered questions about Soviet foreign policy may be provided by Moscow's decision whether to play out its Berlin gamble in the direction of a more lasting *modus vivendi* or in the direction of a dangerous ignition of conflict in the heart of Europe. The path which Moscow takes may reveal not only the cause of the Berlin crisis *per se*, but also why Soviet foreign policy *in toto* has become so erratically bellicose in the past two or three years.

"Conservative" vs. "Liberal" Trends?

In trying to pin down the general line of the Soviet Communist Party, one is struck by its peculiar lack of uniformity. "Conservative" or "Stalinist" tendencies prevailing in certain spheres (such as ideology or the "cult of personality") clash with "liberal" tendencies prevailing in other spheres (*e.g.*, economic policy); the tightening of controls in literature is accompanied by further restrictions on the secret police; increased incentives to peasants go hand in hand with regimentation in education, *etc.* Which of these two tendencies will prevail? No definitive reply can be ventured at this point, inasmuch as this basic disunity has lasted for some time, and all indications point to its continuation in the years ahead.

In comparison with the situation existing in Stalin's time, the presence of conflicting trends is undoubtedly a new phenomenon. In Stalin's time, a kind of "law" of uniformity and uni-direction of basic elements of the party line was obligatory. If one examines any single phase of the thirty years of Stalin's rule, one is struck by the interdependence of the basic elements of the prevailing policy. During the Stalin period, observers of the Soviet scene learned to base their analysis on the "law". Thus a turn in the party line in one area allowed them to predict, more or less correctly, the direction of turns in other areas.

Some observers insist that the present lack of uniformity in the party line is only a passing factor which must give way in the end to a more unified and correlated policy. A number of them are convinced that a decisive reversal towards Stalinism and away from reform is taking place. They minimize the changes which have taken place within the Soviet Union and stress the decisive importance of Soviet foreign policy along with the trend toward a more rigid ideology. Others view the current development more optimistically, predicting that rationalistic transformations in internal life will ultimately cause an abatement of the Soviet ideological flame and a transformation of "peaceful coexistence" from a cold war maneuver to a lasting *modus operandi.*

It is interesting to note that a similar division of opinion exists behind the Iron Curtain. Thus a top party economist in Poland, Wlodzimierz Brus, ended a recent article with these words:

> **The process of development of new forms (in the Soviet Union) is today proceeding most distinctly in the economic field—in model changes which are a sign of the improvement of socialist conditions of production. The influence of economic changes on other areas is not always direct. As Marxists, however, we take into account the determining role of economic transformations which sooner or later influence all levels of the social structure. That is why recognition of the changes occurring should, I believe, be a source of optimism not only for economists.**[5]

What Brus means by "a source of optimism" is clear enough. Being a Communist with decidedly anti-Stalinist and liberal sympathies, Brus feels that internal changes will lead to comparable changes in the ideological countenance of the Soviets. A very different "optimism" has been expressed by certain representatives of the Stalinist wing of the Polish party. For instance, in a speech at a party session in October 1958, Eugenjusz Szyr—a high-ranking party bureaucrat of Stalinist leaning—invoked the new stance of Soviet foreign policy as a pretext for urging a return to a harder line in internal economic policies.

Accommodations of the Economy

It seems to this author, however, that neither brand of "optimism" is well-founded and that it is an error to try to squeeze the general trend of Soviet development into a Procrustean bed of "conservative" or "liber-

[5] *Przeglad Kulturalny* (Warsaw), No. 31, 1958.

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al" formulas. Three important considerations can be advanced which suggest that it is possible for the Soviet Union to maintain its present multi-directional policies.

The first of these considerations is *the present level of Soviet development, particularly in the economic area.* Essentially it was the low level of production in the Stalin era that required a unified line of policy in all fields. Thus the adoption of an aggressive foreign policy led to an emphasis on military production that was almost equivalent to an acceleration in the tempo of economic planning. Since the Soviet economy did not have sufficient means to satisfy the demands for both heavy industrial development (including military hardware) and consumer goods, the inevitable result was an attack on the standard of living. This in turn was accompanied by an increase in terrorism as the only means of obtaining the "agreement" of the population. A similar logic worked in reverse: to justify the deprivations imposed on the Soviet people, the Stalin regime needed disturbances abroad and the image of an external menace; these in turn served to justify chronic witch-hunts and mass terrorism.

At present the Soviet economy has reached a different level of development. To be sure, the principle of priority for heavy industry and military production still holds. (This priority system helps to explain how a country which cannot manufacture a good bicycle can build a modern steel mill or a complicated jet plane.) But whereas in Stalin's day priority in one area meant stagnation and even regression in other areas, today the concentration on military economics required by Soviet foreign policy no longer implies the glaring neglect of other areas or a decline in the standard of living.

The Soviet Union's unusually rapid and successful military development in recent years has, in fact, been accompanied by an increase in agricultural production and in the living standard. Consequently, mass terrorism as a substitute for bread and butter is no longer indispensable. Nor, on the other hand, does the democratization of internal and economic policy require a weakening of the current aggressive foreign policy. In brief, the present economic base of the Soviet Union permits the continuation of apparently contradictory multi-directional policies; but how far these policies can go depends, in part, on how reasonable the various target figures of Khrushchev's new seven-year plan prove to be.

Ends and Means

There is a second consideration which supports the possibility of multi-directional policies: *a lack of uniformity in the directional trends of Soviet policies does not automatically mean a lack of uniformity in their goals.* Let us take the rise of Khrushchev, for example. Democratization of Soviet domestic life proved to be a springboard for Khrushchev's reaching out for power in the party—a development in the Stalinist direction. Conversely, his attainment of a dominant position was a precondition for the realization of further internal reforms. Under conditions of a centralized one-party structure, "collective leadership" can be a form of rule only so long as the prevailing policy is one of maintaining the *status quo* or carrying out superficial improvements. Important political turns and drastic decisions—in whatever direction—require the emergence in the party of a dominant group or individual.

Consider again the relation between domestic and foreign policy. Not only can internal democratization be accompanied by more rigid and offensive foreign policies; under certain circumstances such a combination may even be deliberate, since a shrewd leadership may realize that domestic moderation and reforms can be useful in extending Soviet influence abroad, and thus in supporting an offensive line in the international arena. This is not to say that the Soviet leadership *must* continue its present "cold war" policies. Any decision to modify such policies, however, will not be the result of pressures created by democratization on the home front. Such a decision would be based primarily on a cold-blooded estimate of the most advantageous means of achieving Soviet international goals. What is even more important to bear in mind is that any such decision would not preclude a return at a later, more favorable moment to the old Stalinist methods of foreign policy, even though domestic reforms may go on.

Bloc Pressure

A third and final consideration militating toward continued multi-directional Soviet policies is *the entrance upon the international scene of new Communist countries, primarily Communist China.* This subject is so complex that it can only be touched upon lightly in the space remaining.[6] The rapid expansion of Communist China's strength and influence increasingly restricts the Soviet Union's formerly unlimited freedom to make completely independent decisions, especially in matters of ideology and international policy. Increasingly, decisions in these fields have come to represent an admixture of Soviet views modified by those of other independent

[6] For a detailed analysis of this subject, see Richard Lowenthal, "Shifts and Rifts in the Russo-Chinese Alliance," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1959), p. 14.

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Communist forces, at the moment primarily China. Even if we assume, as is likely, that disagreements are of degree rather than of kind, there still remain important differences in tradition, economic methods, ideological formulation and international position.

Moscow retains full freedom in working out its domestic policy. But in ideological and international matters, that freedom belongs to the past. To preserve its leadership and maintain the uniformity of world communism, the Soviet leadership must be willing to compromise, at least to a certain degree. Therefore, lack of uniformity in the direction of different elements of Soviet policy may indicate not only that Moscow *wants* such a state of affairs, but also that it is in some instances *compelled* to take apparently contradictory lines. This is one of the important lessons of the 21st Congress of the CPSU—one that the outside world should absorb if it is to understand the changing nature of the Soviet state.

The Seven-Year Haul

By Leon M. Herman

DURING THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS, economic activity throughout the Soviet Union will be governed by the provisions of a new master "plan," adopted on February 5, 1959, amidst great verbal pomp and circumstance by the specially convoked 21st CPSU Congress. One unusual feature of the latest plan—its seven-year length instead of the more familiar five years—requires at the outset a brief glance backwards at its predecessor, the sixth five-year plan. The latter, it will be recalled, was unveiled only three years ago, in February 1956, and similarly launched into flight from the platform of a party congress. But it met a premature death soon thereafter, destroyed in mid-flight in September 1957 when the party leadership recognized that some of the principal targets to which it was committed could not be achieved. Time, therefore, had to be taken out to produce a new schedule of targets. Finally, on November 14, 1958, the Soviet press published the new forecast, submitted by Premier Khrushchev for "consideration" by the forthcoming party congress under the heading of "Control Figures for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR during 1959-65."

With this act, the familiar, neat continuity of quinquennial plan cycles was broken. The present seven-year plan has been designed not only to pick up the wreckage left by the plan that fell apart, but presumably also to pave the way for a resumption of the former sequence after 1965.

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To no one's surprise, the Soviet economy suffered no visible adverse effects in the course of the two "planless" years, 1957-58. Economic growth continued, at the wonted pace and according to the established order of priorities. This rather undramatic fact helps to underscore the special character of the long-term, or "perspective," plan in the scheme of Soviet central economic planning. The long-term plan has evolved gradually as an ancillary, decorative feature of the planning mechanism, in contrast to the annual plan which serves as the operational blueprint for the economy and which it never made public. While the data of the five- (or seven)-year plan are necessarily drawn from the technical planning departments, its function is to present to the outside world a highly selective summary of expectations, a summary in which economic substance is blended with liberal portions of political rhetoric.

The Formula

While the precise forecasts of the present plan must thus be treated as more or less feasible desiderata, intended to "inspire the labor enthusiasm of the masses," an inquiry into the provisions of the plan is nevertheless useful: it can shed some light on the general direction in which the Soviet economy will be guided, on the relative rates at which the political authorities expect the individual economic sectors to grow, on some of the economic problems that will confront the leadership during the years ahead, and finally on the margin by

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which the welfare of the Soviet citizen is likely to improve during the period.

If the detailed economic predictions of the seven-year plan are in part educated guesswork, its party sponsors are at least certain of one thing, namely their full control over the main course along which the economy will be driven. In the Soviet setting, this kind of control is exercised through the allocation of new capital. It takes a predictable amount of capital (new plant and equipment) to expand economic capacity. The Soviet economy is distinctively an economy of high capital accumulation and investment. Hence large blocks of resources have to be diverted from consumption every year, by a combination of physical controls and price policy. The volume thus accumulated is then invested in accordance with a centrally imposed pattern of priorities.

On this score, it may be reported, there are no surprises in the present plan. Adherence to the tried and true pattern of capital investment as inherited from Stalin is quite complete. In fact, the plan tends, if anything, toward even greater emphasis on the "hard" or "production" sectors of the economy.

The overall size of the investment pie—a vast sum of 1,970 billion rubles—is larger by some 80 percent than the amount of new capital invested during the preceding seven years: o. this total 77 percent is designated for the expansion of "productive" facilities in industry, agriculture and transport; 19 percent for "unproductive" construction such as housing, municipal and trade facilities; and less than 4 percent for "cultural" facilities such as schools, theaters and hospitals. The bias against the "services" sector has increased. Compared to the present allotment of 77 percent, the production sectors received only 71 percent of actual capital investment during the last completed five-year plan, 1951-55.

The share of industry alone, always the prime beneficiary of investment, is as usual somewhat more than 50 percent of the planned total. Within the industrial sector, moreover, the distribution of the capital fund will be along well-tested lines: 90 percent of all new outlays will be used to equip plants feeding producer goods into the economy (fuel, metals, machinery, including armaments); only 10 percent will go to expand available facilities for consumer goods production.

The Loss of Momentum

One reason that may help to account for the stress on the "hard" ingredients of the economic growth formula is the perceptible slowdown in the momentum of economic expansion. This evident decline in the rate of annual growth is an unpalatable fact for the Soviet leadership to accept, since the Communist doctrine has always maintained that through central planning a steady rate of economic expansion can be achieved in perpetuum. It is now generally agreed that the official disinclination to accept the "capitalist" law of diminishing returns—that is, to face the fact of inevitable economic slowdown—was palpably responsible for the inflated targets of the sixth five-year plan, causing its premature collapse. By contrast, the seven-year plan reflects in its more realistic make-up a tacit move toward accepting this fundamental economic fact, in practice if not as yet in theory. At the same time, however, the plan has been so conceived as to attempt to counteract the forces at work in this loss of momentum.

The provision for a slower rate of growth is thus one of the prominent features of the plan, manifesting itself in all areas of economic activity. This may be illustrated by contrasting the annual percentage increases projected in the old as against the new plan with regard to the principal indicators in the economy:

	Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60)	*Seven-Year Plan** (1959-65)
National income	10.0	7.4
Gross industrial product	10.5	8.6
Capital goods	11.2	9.4
Consumer goods	10.0	7.4
Gross output of agriculture	11.0	8.0
Labor productivity (in industry)	8.4	6.0
Railway freight turnover	7.3	5.5

* *Maximum end of range given in official targets.*

Similarly, within each individual branch of production in industry, agriculture and transport, the planned rate of annual increase has been adjusted downward for all principal commodities—including steel, coal, petroleum, electric power, machine tools, locomotives, trucks, grain, milk, meat, cotton, wool.

The causes of the slowdown are not hard to find. After thirty years of forced growth large-scale economic enterprise in the USSR now covers most of the domestic resource landscape. Conversely, the expanse of the economic frontier is steadily shrinking. This is especially true with regard to the supply of raw materials for industry. Consumption of minerals has grown enormously since the beginning of massive industrialization in 1928. To cite some obvious examples, Soviet industry is now consuming annually about 100 million tons of petroleum, 100 million tons of iron ore and 500 million tons of coal. Hence, the search for an adequate supply of minerals takes the Soviet mining industry either deeper into the bowels of the earth or farther into the regions of the East, away from the centers of production and

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population. Either way, it requires an ever greater input of capital or increase of transport to produce and deliver new raw material. Moreover, metal ores must be used that are poorer in content and therefore more costly to process.

This type of problem is not, of course, especially stressed in the current plan. Its business is to focus attention on the promises of the future, not on the problems of the present. Yet the practical difficulties lying ahead in the field of basic production cannot be altogether obscured; they are inherent in the hard data. Just how capital-intensive the basic industries have become may be illustrated with the case of steel: in order to achieve a planned increase in steel output of 65 percent in the next seven years, the investment of new capital will have to be 2.4 times larger, and the outlay on new ore resources 2.8 times larger, than was required to achieve a roughly comparable increase in the past seven years.

The trend is the same in one branch of production after another, varying only in degree. In the chemical industry, 4.3 times as much investment will be needed as in the past to achieve a three-fold increase in the level of production. Sizing up industry as a whole, a two-fold increase in new capital will be required by 1965 to generate a projected 78 percent increase in output.

The Factor of Rationality

It seems clear, then, that while the process of expansion must be continued at all cost, future strides will have to be made on the basis of diminishing returns. This sobering fact in itself brings Soviet industry closer to the experience of the more developed western industrial nations. If the Soviet planners want to get the most out of their efforts for continued expansion, they will have to pay more attention to the lessons learned in the process of advancing industrial development in the West. In particular, they will have to give more consideration to the cost element in industrial operations and to the rational use of materials and equipment in line with relative scarcities in the economy. The seven-year plan proposes to adopt these lessons in several ways:

1). By a sharp shift away from coal in favor of petroleum, a far more efficient industrial fuel. Coal extraction, the authorities have now discovered, requires three times as much manpower as petroleum of equal caloric value. The United States experience in this field is now openly cited by Soviet economists as a test of economic rationality: at present, petroleum accounts for 67 percent of the total fuel consumption in this country, but only 24 percent in the Soviet Union. A costly fuel, in turn, inflates the cost of most goods produced by the economy.

2). By a rapid conversion of the railway system to diesel and electric locomotives. At present, steam traction still accounts for 74 percent of all railway engines. By 1965, the plan calls for an increase in the share of non-steam locomotives to 85 percent of the total, or just about the present US proportion.

3). By an increase in the allocation of new funds (103 billion rubles, or 10 percent of all industrial capital) for the modernization of the chemical industry. Half of this large investment, it is indicated, will go into new plants equipped to produce artificial fibers,

Vox Populi, Soviet Style:

In all the speeches of tens of millions of Soviet people, workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia who discussed with tremendous patriotic enthusiasm the target figures of the seven-year plan, one and only one thought is revealed, one wish and one striving, to fullfill and to overfulfill the seven-year plan target figures.— *Pravda editorial, Jan. 27, 1959.*

Welder Ulesov . . . twice hero of socialist labor, said: "I, a Soviet worker, wish to say from the bottom of my heart and in full voice: 'Long live our seven-year plan!' We are ready for labor, for new exploits. The seven-year plan will not only be fulfilled—it will be overfulfilled." The Ukrainian woman collective farmer . . . M. Khan said: "We have only one wish—to complete everything that is scheduled for seven years ahead of schedule. This is why everyone of us is trying to do today more than yesterday, and tomorrow more than today. By our work we glorify our Leninist party and will honorably fulfill its plans."—*Pravda editorial, Jan. 26.*

A worker of the Lihacheva automobile works in Moscow, Comrade Nikitin, said in his speech at a crowded meeting held by the staff of the enterprise: "The 21st Congress of the CPSU will enter world history as a great landmark signifying a new stage in the life of mankind. Our hearts beat with joy when we think that we have entered the period of all-out building of communism." The thoughts of the collective farmers . . . have been well expressed by collective farmer Mikhailichenko of Strana Sovetov farm, Rubtsovsky Raion, Altai Krai, who said: "I give thanks to the Communist Party for its daily motherly care to improve our life. I, an ordinary peasant, want to say with all my heart: "Grow strong and live long, our own party, our strength, our wisdom, our honor, and our pride and glory!"— *Pravda editorial, Jan. 30.*

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plastics, synthetic rubber, and alcohol. Hitherto, much economic substance was admittedly wasted by the use of more costly raw materials, chiefly animal products and farm crops, including such essential foodstuffs as potatoes and grain.

Bigger or Better Labor Force?

Another area in which the current plan has specified a rather urgent assignment is in the recruitment and utilization of the industrial labor force. In the past, the task of obtaining new manpower has caused no great difficulty. A rapid rate of recruitment raised the industrial force from three million workers in 1928 to 15.7 million by the end of 1957, or 12 percent larger than in the United States. In the same year, there were twice as many (800,000) Soviet as American engineers employed in industry. Yet even in the self-serving estimate of the Soviet press, the product turned out annually by industry in the USSR amounts to only half that in the US. The plain conclusion is that the productivity of the Soviet industrial worker is less than half that of his American counterpart.

In a recent revealing discussion of this lag, a Soviet economist—while attempting to adhere to the lame official explanation that the American worker is compelled to labor more intensively—demonstrated just the opposite by noting that the effort of the US industrial employee is supported by a more abundant supply of electric power per worker and a wider range of mechanized tools. He indicated that this was especially true of the auxiliary operations in industry, an area of extremely low labor productivity.[1]

According to the provisions of the new plan, the industrial labor force is to be increased by some 12 million persons, or 22 percent by 1965, while labor productivity in industry is to rise by 50 percent. For several reasons, it seems fair to anticipate that these goals will prove extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill.

In the first place, all previous Soviet plans have been based on the assumption of a given increase in labor productivity. In most cases the increases failed to materialize as projected. The regime's usual remedy has been to throw in extra manpower. In the fifth plan, 3.8 million additional non-farm workers were recruited over and above the target of 5.7 million.

For the seven years ahead, however, there are no such prodigious reserves of new labor for use in industry. The low birth rate during World War II is reflected today in a lean supply of new recruits for the labor force, a situation which will continue at least until 1963. Yet, the plan calls for 1.7 million new workers every year. Some signs of concern over where the added numbers will be found have appeared in the press, including a recent suggestion by a Soviet manpower expert (in *Trud*, Jan. 22, 1959) calling for a more energetic effort to bring housewives and other unemployed women in the 50-55 age bracket into the labor force, since "the natural increase in persons of working age will not be sufficient." The older women, he proposes, should be used in white-collar posts, thereby "releasing many younger, able-bodied persons for work in direct production."

The task of finding the planned number of production workers is only half the problem, and the lesser half at that. If the 1965 target in total industrial output is to be met, namely a volume 78 percent larger than in 1958, the productivity of each worker will have to rise annually by a sizeable margin. The plan itself sets this margin at 6 percent a year. However, the author of the above-mentioned article in *Trud*—by taking into account the promised reduction in working hours per week (to be discussed)—has calculated that the rate of increase in labor productivity would have to be no less than 9 percent a year. So high a target, at this stage in Soviet industrial development, must be regarded by sober economists in the USSR as palpably out of reach. Over the past seven years, the annual gain in industrial productivity averaged to only 7.3 percent, and was moving slowly but steadily downward.

The Welfare Ingredient

While the planners' estimate of the needed increase in productivity may be low, the proposition that the individual Soviet worker can and must make a better showing forms one of the central themes of the current plan. Toward this end the regime has taken at least some steps to improve the climate for economic incentive. Significantly, the text of the plan urges upon the Soviet elite the need to be guided by Lenin's admonition that "without the element of material self-interest it is impossible to lead millions and tens of millions of people towards communism". This is not just another quotation to bolster the impression of orthodoxy; it constitutes in effect the practical political formula by which Khrushchev has guided his economic policy during the past five years. As the heir to Stalin's empire, Khrushchev could not possibly be expected to substitute the consumer for the state as the prime beneficiary of the productive process; he is clearly not that kind of self-destructive innovator. He is, however, realist enough to recognize that a

[1] P. Belousov, in *Promyshlenno-Ekonomecheskaia Gazeta*, Nov. 21, 1958.

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vast amount of the qualitative lag in the performance of the Soviet economy can be traced to the absence of real incentives for hard work and for the best utilization of available resources.

So far a good part of Khrushchev's corrective effort has, as is known, gone into agriculture, where a series of measures have been initiated to relax tension between the regime and the peasants. He now appears to be convinced that he has improved the climate for better performance in the villages.[2]

With regard to the urban population and particularly the industrial workers, Khrushchev's approach to the incentive question first became apparent in several well-advertised labor and welfare reforms adopted during 1956-57. These dealt for the most part with the depressed areas in Soviet social life, such as the scanty minimum wage, low pensions, *etc.* Apparently the reforms have had the desired effect on public morale by affording some relief from the grimness of the workers' accustomed lot. Probably they have been most important, however, as a token of a less stringent attitude toward the population on the part of the Khrushchev leadership—an attitude which by implication asks for collaboration rather than blind obedience.

[2] For a comprehensive review of recent Soviet agricultural policy, see L. Volin, "Reforms in Agriculture," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1959), p. 35.

Under the circumstances, the seven-year plan could do no less than carry this trend forward, demonstrating the good will of the regime with concrete if still limited labor rewards. The effort to spur incentive is revealed in the plan's treatment of three problem areas—the length of the work-week, housing and wages.

Most interesting of all is the manner in which the commitment on the work-week has been spelled out. Evidently in an effort to avoid the kind of popular skepticism occasioned in the past by promises made in general terms, the plan presents a specific time-table according to which the work-week will be reduced in the years ahead. All workers are promised a 41-hour week by 1960, to be reduced to 40 hours by 1962. In 1964 further efforts are planned to scale down the work-week, by stages, to 35 hours. Another stated aim is to reduce work-time for difficult or dangerous jobs by an extra five hours per week.

With this promise on the record, the verbal magic of the long-term plan makes it possible, by telescoping six years and focussing on the planned result, to dispel the present reality with its dreary work-week of 46 hours and to make a bold announcement to the effect that the Soviet Union has all but achieved the shortest work-week in the world. Yet the hard realities, it is fair to assume, will probably tempt the regime to hold back on the promised reduction in hours until it sees a measurable improvement in labor numbers and productivity. One

Major Targets of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65)*

Product	*Unit*	*1965 Target*	*1958 Output*	*Planned Increase (%)*
Electric Power	Billion kwh	520	233	123
Coal	Million metric tons	609	496	23
Petroleum	"	240	113	112
Steel	"	91	54.9	65
Cement	"	81	33.3	143
Fertilizers	"	36	12.4	190
Cotton Fabrics	Million meters	8,000	5,800	38
Wool Fabrics	"	500	303	65
Shoes	Million pairs	515	356	45
Fish	Million metric tons	4.6	2.9	60
Sugar	"	10	5.4	90
Grain	"	180	139	30
Cotton	"	6.1	4.4	39
Meat (Carcass weight)	"	16	7.9	103
Milk	"	105	57.8	81
Butter	Thousand metric tons	1,006	638	58

* *Targets cited are the upper end of the range given in the text of the plan.*
Sources: Pravda, *Nov. 14; Dec. 28, 1958; Jan. 15, 1959.*

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fact will be difficult to escape—namely, that the loss of work hours by 1965 will have the effect of cancelling out 20 of the 22 percent planned increase in the size of the labor force.

IN THE AREA OF HOUSING, the plan anticipates a notable increase over the present scale of new construction. The aggregate of the 60-odd million square meters of living space being built annually at present is supposed to rise to 90 million square meters by 1965. So abysmal, however, is the present state of affairs in housing that even at the end of this building campaign, if wholly successful, the amount of space at the disposal of the average city dweller will be below the officially established sanitary minimum of nine square meters per person. Instead of the present 5.5. square meters, he will have something like eight square meters, equivalent to an average of more than two persons per room.

In terms of dwelling units, the expected increment in new urban construction during the plan period is 15 million apartments, a figure which in itself seems impressive. But in the light of the projected addition of 12 million persons to the urban labor force, this fact loses some of its luster. Given the acute shortage of housing which already exists, there seems little reason to expect much alleviation of the conditions which plague the average city dweller — overcrowding in sub-standard quarters; inadequate maintenance, repair and utility services; and probably most annoying, the forced sharing of kitchen and bathroom facilities by several families.[3]

In the realm of wages, the seven-year plan is conspicuously uninspiring. It offers no improvement whatever in the earnings of the various professionals constituting the Soviet elite, who have by all accounts been treated rather well in the past. It does, however, pursue the unfinished business of bringing up the income of the lowest paid workers and pensioners to the minimum level of decency; both minimum wages and pensions will be raised, in several stages, from 350 to 600 rubles a month. A pair of shoes costs 300-400 rubles.

By the end of the plan period, the average wage of the Soviet worker is expected to rise by 26 percent, or from 785 to 990 rubles a month. At the tourist rate of exchange of ten rubles to the dollar (which represents a rough equivalence of purchasing power), this will give the average Soviet worker, seven years hence, 23 dollars in earnings a week—an amount which will buy back only a modicum of the goods produced for the state by his labor.

[3] For a discussion of Soviet housing problems, see Timothy Sosnovy, "Housing in the Workers' State," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. V, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1956), p. 31.

Plan Ambitions

Every economic prospectus made public in the USSR has its "international significance." In this regard, the present plan is no exception. To the extent that the overriding purpose is to expand the base of Soviet economic power, the plan aims simultaneously at increasing the capability of the Kremlin leadership to influence the course of events in the outside world. As Khrushchev professes to see it, the sheer impact of the Soviet example of "building socialism and communism in our country" will bring about this gain in influence.

It is wholly unlikely, however, that by putting 26 percent more rubles in the pocket of the sorely deprived Soviet worker, the regime seriously expects to dazzle citizens in the industrialized societies into abandoning their orderly course toward the more abundant life for the rocky road of Soviet forced capital-oriented industrialization. Such societies are obviously not the target of the present seven-year campaign to enhance the "attractions" of the Soviet system.

Rather, the unrelieved stress on basic economic and military strength bespeaks the intent of the Soviet leadership to have at hand the hard resources needed to make inroads into the economically less developed regions, with their less stable social structures. There, the opportunities for political gain, as shown by the recent experience of the Khrushchev regime, are legion. The Kremlin wants to be ready, first, to extend all-out support, including surplus weapons, to any minority power group abroad interested in seizing and holding power in accordance with the Soviet political prescription. Further, the Soviet rulers want equally to strengthen their appeal to less force-minded groups of potential leaders; to them, it expects to demonstrate the practical fact that the Soviet system has moved a long way from its original ideological moorings and has become primarily the external expression of a formula for the stimulation and maintenance of economic growth—a formula which, however, depends for its success on a total monopoly of power and control at the center. Any society can, presumably, have the use of this formula—provided that the resulting concentration of local power is deemed useful in the long run to the relentless drive of Soviet expansion.

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Socialist Legality: The Mountain Has Labored

By Leon Lipson

LIKE MOST OF THE SPEECHES at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, this brief article reporting on new Soviet criminal laws should begin with a ritual invocation of the name of N. S. Khrushchev, who in one of the neo-Periclean passages of his address to the Congress showed himself to be *(ex-officio)* a leading legal philosopher as well as a theoretician of Marxism-Leninism. The First Secretary told the Congress:

> Social [non-governmental] organizations must acquire jurisdiction more and more over problems of the security of public order and the rules of socialist communal life. At the present time there are no instances of court liability in the Soviet Union for political crimes. This is doubtless a great achievement. It bespeaks the unprecedented unity of the political convictions of our entire people, of its solidarity around the Communist Party and Soviet rule.
>
> But there are still not a few instances of violations of public order, and a decisive struggle must be waged against them. Cannot Soviet society cope with the violators of socialist legal order? Of course it can. Our social organizations have no fewer possibilities, equipment, and power for this than the organs of the police, the court, and the procuracy!
>
> The point is that functions of security of public order and safety should be fulfilled by social organizations as well as by such state institutions as the police and the courts. . . .[1]

The theme of the larger role envisaged for extra-governmental machinery in sustaining the Soviet legal order is one to which we shall return. It was echoed—with a difference—by A. N. Shelepin, Chairman of the Committee on State Security, who congratulated the party on the full restoration of "revolutionary legality," in a possibly inadvertent revival of a phrase that had lost its vogue, and assured the Congress that "the shameful business of violations of legality will never be repeated any more. The party and its Central Committee will not allow it." [2]

Shelepin, like Khrushchev, spoke of prophylactic measures to be undertaken especially by non-governmental organizations, supplementing or substituting for the regular legal machinery. He stressed the supervision of "work-therapy" by social organizations:

> I think we ought to consider affording rights to social organizations—Komsomol, trade unions, collective plants and factories, and *kolkhozes*—to take under their wing misguided people who have committed insignificant crimes so as to give them the opportunity of reforming themselves in the collective instead of serving out a punishment imposed by a court.[3]

It may be wondered whether part of the impetus for this suggestion came from considerations of the needs of Soviet manpower. Shelepin may have reflected that corrective-labor colonies were not as efficient users of convict labor as labor unions and collective farms could be, and he may have had his eye focused not so much on rehabilitation through work as on work through rehabilitation.

New Laws—Old Legacies

The longer-range implications of these and other remarks made at the 21st Congress must be assessed against the background of broad changes taking place in the Soviet legal system as a result of the "new look" turned upon it after the death of Stalin. After years of drafting and months of debate, a start has finally been made toward the enactment of the long-promised all-Union codes of law, aimed at the restoration of "socialist legality" in the Soviet system. A month before the 21st Congress met, the Supreme Soviet enacted a series of

[1] *Izvestiia,* Jan. 28, 1959, p. 9.

Professor Lipson is on the faculty of the Yale University Law School, New Haven, Conn. *For a comprehensive review and analysis of post-Stalin legal reforms, helpful as a background to the present article, readers are referred to his "The New Face of Socialist Legality," which appeared in the July-August 1958 issue of this journal.*

[2] *Ibid,* Feb. 5, 1959, p. 1.

[3] *Pravda,* Feb. 5, 1959, p. 8.

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statutes, including Fundamentals of Criminal Law, new laws on liability for state crimes and military crimes, Fundamentals of Criminal Justice, and a new Judiciary Act.[4]

Still in gestation are other "fundamental" laws—all-Union basic statutes for civil law, civil procedure, labor law, the regime of the collective-labor colonies, *et al.* And the various republics still have to pass detailed legislation to bring their codes into conformity with the all-Union laws, presumably amending or repealing any existing inconsistent legislation.

Even at this stage, however, it is possible to make a tentative appraisal of the effects of the statutes already enacted. On the whole these indicate that the reforming spirit of 1956-57 has, from the regime's point of view, been rather successfully "contained"; some steps have been taken in the right direction, but they are not very large ones and their direction is unclear.

Deletions and Definitions

Among these, substantive criminal law has deleted the old reference to analogy, under which a "socially dangerous" act not previously made punishable by statute could be punished under whatever statute fitted most closely. The authority to punish defendants who had committed no recent crime but fell under suspicion because of prior antisocial activity or association with other criminals has been dropped. The definition of treason, according to D. S. Polianski (Chairman of the Commission on Draft Legislation of the Soviet of the Union), places a new emphasis on the necessary element of intent; it still includes, however, flight from the USSR or the refusal to return to the USSR from abroad. Terrorism, which Polianski conceded had often been broadly interpreted in the past because it had not been defined with sufficient precision, is now specified as "the killing of a state or public official or representative of authority, committed in connection with his state or public activity, with the aim of undermining or weakening Soviet power"—or "grievous bodily harm inflicted with the same purposes" upon a victim of the same status. There is no specific reference to the punishment of relatives of defecting servicemen; the legislation establishing such culpability in the past has, we are told, been suspended *de facto*. Concealment of crimes and failure to report crimes are, as before, punishable only where the criminal law specifically says so, but a specific provision establishing punishment for failure to report is included in the new Law on State Crimes.

Until the Republican codes are promulgated it will not be possible to enumerate the acts that have lost their criminal character as a result of the new reforms. The criminal responsibility of juveniles has been lightened somewhat: persons who commit crimes between the ages of 14 and 16 are criminally responsible only for specified major crimes, and persons who have, before reaching the age of 18, committed crimes "representing no great social danger" may at the discretion of the courts be treated by compulsory measures of an educational character without formal criminal punishment. Many of the maximum sentences have been somewhat shortened; on the other hand, the criteria for parole, especially for major criminals and recidivists, have been stiffened, and an attempt has been made to stop the practice of speeding eligibility for parole by the over-liberal crediting of "labor days" for time served in confinement.

Under the new Fundamentals of Criminal Law, punishment "not only is a penalty for the crime committed, but also is aimed at the correction and reformation of those convicted, . . . [instilling] an honorable attitude toward work, exact obedience to the laws, respect for the rules of socialist community life, and also [is aimed at] the deterrence of those convicted as well as of others from new crimes." Perhaps the draftsmen of the new legislation considered deterrence more important than rehabilitation for a number of offenses, for the death penalty is to be retained for treason, espionage, diversion (defined in the Law on State Crimes as a sort of major sabotage), terrorism, banditry, and intentional homicide in "aggravating circumstances"; it will also be applied in special cases to other "heinous crimes." From the text it is not clear what will be covered in the catch-all provision at the end of the list. A deputy from Adygei Autonomous Oblast, addressing the Supreme Soviet while the new laws were under consideration, complained of the action of appellate courts in reversing convictions for intentional homicide on the ground that the victim survived; his protest was based on the fact that the defendant had after all "done all he could to carry out his intent to kill." The catch-all provision, when spelled out by detailed Republican laws, may make it possible in such cases to apply the death penalty without distorting the definition of homicide.

Procedural reforms are modest. The dual system of investigation, under which the police make one inquiry and an investigator under the functional supervision of the procuracy makes another, is retained for an (unspecified) assortment of crimes. Certain state crimes,

[4] These measures are published in *Izvestiia*, Dec. 26, 1958, pp. 2-7; and in *Vedomosti*, Jan. 1, 1959 (933), Items 3-32

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indeed, have three sets of investigators, the third being those from the organs of state security; some minor crimes may be investigated by the police only. The investigator has been afforded what may or may not prove to be a substantial working authority over the police.

Right of counsel has been broadened at both ends of trial process: the accused is now to be permitted counsel from the time the accusation is communicated to him, though not as of right during the time of the preliminary investigation, and defense counsel now has the express right to take part in a hearing on appeal after conviction. Even the small changes in the role of defense counsel appear to have met with some opposition, which D. Rasulov (Chairman of the Commission on Draft Legislation of the Soviet of Nationalities) endeavored to allay in his presentation to the Supreme Soviet:

The drafting committees proceed from the idea that defense counsel is obliged to use all means envisaged by the law in the defense of the accused and to furnish the accused the necessary legal assistance. Together with this it must be emphasized that from the viewpoint of Soviet law and the principles of socialist morality defense counsel may not conduct himself so as by any method whatever to hedge his defendant about with protection against condign justice. Soviet defense counsel must serve the great humane cause of the defense of socialist society, law, truth and justice. That is the way to define his course of conduct in the defense of the accused—that is where the task of defense counsel lies, and not in the defense of illegal chicanery on the part of the accused, which would inevitably grow into defense of a criminal and thus of crime.[5]

Evidence is to be evaluated, as before, in accordance with the inner convictions of the judges (and lay assessors). Their decisions are to be made "on the basis of the law, in conformity with socialist law-consciousness, and under conditions that exclude any partial influence on the judges." [6] The suggestion that the role of judge and assessor be distinguished by means of a closer approach to the jury system has been rejected, though the term of office of the judge has been extended from three to five years and the term within which a people's assessor remains subject to call has been reduced from three years to two.

The Burden of Proof

The long-vexing question of the presumption of innocence has been dodged again. Instead of taking an explicit position, as many Soviet writers had urged, the Fundamentals of Criminal Justice set forth a formula which bears all the stigmata of a compromise that makes none of the compromisers happy:

The court, procurator, investigator, and person conducting the [police, *etc.*] inquiry do not have the right to shift the burden of proof onto the accused.[7]

Even when this formula is combined with the principle, stated elsewhere in the Fundamentals, that "conviction cannot be founded on presumptions and shall be pronounced only in the event that the guilt of the accused has been proved in the course of the judicial hearing," [8] it fails to illuminate the problem of the quantum of proof necessary to translate an "inner conviction" into an outer conviction, and gives no clear guidance to local officials.

The contrasting inferences still possible may be seen in two of the official remarks accompanying the "discussion" of the drafts in the Supreme Soviet. A. F. Gorkin, a Deputy from the Kirghiz SSR, referred to "the principle, flowing from the sense and spirit of our legislation, according to which the proof of an accusation rests at the charge of the accuser and the accused is not obliged to prove his innocence." Yet Deputy B. S. Sharkov from the Lithuanian Republic, inveighing against "certain scholars who still have not emerged from their ivory towers," scolded those who had "attempted to introduce into our theory and practice the outworn dogmas of bourgeois law in the nature of a presumption of innocence." He ridiculed a suggested formula to the effect that the accused should be considered innocent until his guilt was established by the lawfully pronounced sentence of a court, and went on:

. . . enactment of such a formula into our law would entail irreconcilable contradictions. Take a case like this: a murderer, a bandit, is caught at the scene of the crime with the goods on him. The investigator and procurator make a careful investigation in full conformity with the law and establish the guilt of the bandit, though even without that his guilt was evident to everyone. On the basis of the law and the indisputable evidence collected, the investigator and the procurator not only have a right but are obliged in duty to hale the murderer to criminal liability and place him under guard. At the same time, according to the formula being proposed, if it were enacted into law, the investigator and the procurator would be obliged to consider that bandit innocent. More than that—inasmuch as it is stressed that the accused shall be considered innocent up to the time the sentence enters into lawful force, the result is that even the court, when it has considered the case and is issuing its sentence of conviction, is obliged to consider that accused

[5] *Izvestiia,* Dec. 26, 1958, p. 11.
[6] Fundamentals of Criminal Justice, Art. 10
[7] *Ibid.,* Art. 14.
[8] *Ibid.,* Art. 43.

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innocent. The absurdity of such a state of affairs from the viewpoint of common sense is beyond dispute. The only thing that passes understanding is, why is this not clear to the said theoreticians? [9]

When Is a Court Not a Court?

The most fateful reform in Soviet criminal law may be presaged by developments that are not even mentioned in the new laws. That is nothing less than the possibility of a substantial incursion of unofficial tribunals—folk-moots, or kangaroo courts, or comrades' courts—into the jurisdiction of the regular criminal courts. The new laws do specify that "criminal punishment shall be applied only by the sense of a court" and that "justice in criminal cases shall be meted out only by a court. No one may be acknowledged guilty of a crime and subjected to criminal punishment save by sentence of a court." [10]

These principles seem to be regarded as excluding the possibility of a return of the administrative special boards which functioned under the old Ministry of the Interior, the dreaded *troikas* that are said to have been abolished in 1953. A number of special courts have also been abolished, though military courts remain and indeed will try—in addition to ordinary military cases—all cases on espionage; [11] they also may cover all civil and criminal cases in places where, because of exceptional circumstances, the regular courts are not sitting.[12] Yet nothing has been said to indicate that the new legislation must lead to the repeal of the anti-parasite laws, which in some republics have led to the establishment of people's neighborhood courts empowered to sentence persons to as much as five years' banishment to distant regions of the republic. Moreover, the care with which some of the references to the new laws stress the "criminal" character of the proceedings over which the regular courts are to have exclusive jurisdiction may hint at a plan to preserve or even extend the anti-parasite statutes on the ground that the offenses at which they aim and the penalties which they authorize are not "criminal."

The principal reason for maintaining the possibility of this interpretation is, as noted at the start of this paper, the importance attached by the top Soviet leaders to the progressive transfer of various functions from governmental to non-governmental hands. Khrushchev, elaborating on his aforementioned recommendation that the task of safeguarding the public order be shared by public organizations, said in his speech at the 21st Congress:

Socialist society is creating such voluntary organs . . . as the people's police, comrades' courts, and similar bodies. They will operate afresh, fulfill public functions afresh. Voluntary detachments of the people's police must take on themselves the securing of public order in their settlements. . . . The time has come to pay great attention to the comrades' courts, which must in the main endeavor to avert various kinds of violations. They must take up not only questions of an industrial-productive character but also of a moral and daily-living character, instances of incorrect conduct of members of the collective, which permit deviations from the norms of public order. . . . The main thing is this prophylactic, educational work.[13]

It seems likely that a generation of Soviet legal and governmental officials will be kept busy attaching some meaning to Mr. Khrushchev's extensive but cryptic re-

[9] *Izvestiia,* Dec. 27, 1958, p. 3.

[10] Fundamentals of Criminal Law, Art. 3; Fundamentals of Criminal Justice, Art. 7.

[11] Decree on Military Courts, Art. 9 (d)

[12] *Ibid.,* Art. 10.

[13] *Izvestiia,* Jan. 28, 1959, p. 9.

THE WORKERS' GRIP

Label on arm: The Workers' Militia.
Text, below right: "It's about time we took care of these hooligans once and for all. I think that the organization of detachments of workers' militia will help in the struggle against hooliganism."—From a letter to the editors sent by student V. P. Vomperski.

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), Jan. 20, 1959.*

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Communism in India

EDITORS' NOTE: The following articles, which discuss two distinct features of Communist strategy and tactics in India, constitute the fourth installment of this journal's series on Soviet and Communist activities in underdeveloped areas. (See also the review by G. S. Bhargava on p. 51 of this issue.) Future articles will deal with the Middle East, as well as with the applicability of Marxist doctrine and Soviet experience to the economic and political dilemmas of underdeveloped countries as a whole.

The Dilemma of the CPI

By Selig S. Harrison

DISCUSSIONS OF INDIAN COMMUNISM normally have as their point of departure the long-standing factional conflict between proponents of the "hard" insurrectionist line which prevailed in varying measure from 1948 to 1953 and the "soft" parliamentary line presently in force. Thus the recent polemical assault on Prime Minister Nehru by the Soviet Ambassador in Peking, Pavel Yudin, aroused immediate speculation that a swing back to violent adventures is in the making.

The Yudin article is indeed notable both for the irreverent and strident tone of its references to Nehru and for certain pointed warnings of "inevitable" struggles for reform in the course of India's transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society—reform which, if not "effected from above, by the initiative of the government, will be effected in a more radical way from below, by the people themselves." [1] Yudin writes, moreover, at a moment of unprecedented self-doubt and uncertainty in India. Demoralization in the Congress Party, incipient inflation, parochialism run rampant, a mood of growing indiscipline—of "I'll get mine," all go to make up a volatile atmosphere of instability. It is in this atmosphere that the Indian Communists are no doubt carrying on a momentous internal debate, and in such a climate the case for a "radical initiative" of one sort or another must appear compelling. But the choice before the Indian Communists is not, in essence, one between an *insurrectionist* radical initiative and parliamentary moderation. The fundamental dilemma confronting Indian communism relates only indirectly to the "hard"-*vs.*-"soft" controversy. This is the dilemma arising from the possibility that the multi-lingual subcontinent, now for the first time encompassed within a unified Indian state, will not remain, at all times in the years ahead, a politically integrated whole.[2]

What the Indian Communists must decide is whether to base their strategy on the expectation of a stable Indian

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[1] Pavel Yudin, "Can We Agree With Jawaharlal's 'Basic Approach'?," *World Marxist Review—Problems of Peace and Socialism,* December, 1958. This is a rejoinder to an essay by Nehru which appeared in the *AICC Economic Review,* New Delhi, August 15, 1958.

[2] For a fuller discussion of this possibility, see the author's "The Challenge to Indian Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1956.

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body politic, or to assume the worst, that India after Nehru will be a congeries of loosely-related regional parts. The present Indian Communist line on the "national question" nominally assumes that Indian unity will survive and that a nationwide united front between Communist and nationalist elements can in fact be established—that Communist control over all of India can eventually be accomplished, in short, at a single stroke. Prior to 1953, however, the party was committed to a separatist line addressed deliberately to the regional chauvinism of the Indian Union's ten major component linguistic territories.[3] In its initial stages at least, this line assumed that Indian unity would not survive and that control of India had to be and could most readily be attained piecemeal.

The case for a separatist line gains strength from the elemental power of regional loyalties in a civilization which has persistently failed, for all its cultural coherence, to establish enduring political unity. British rule imposed an administrative superstructure over linguistic territories possessing remarkably continuous and separate historic identities. The linguistic map of India today differs only in detail from the linguistic map of India at the time of Christ, and each region lays claim, as a consequence, to its own exclusive historical golden ages, memorialized by its own time-honored regional literature written in its own ancient script. Independence was the signal for each region to invoke historical memory and, in the name of past greatness, to assert its own interests over those of all the rest in the new India.

The regional pattern of Indian Communist successes corresponds strikingly to the degree of Communist identification with regional aspirations during the pre-1953 period. The two regions in which the Communists are now in power or within reach of it (Kerala and Andhra) happen to be those where they laid effective claim to the championship of regional interests. Conversely, the regions where a Communist or Communist-controlled local regime seems most improbable (*e.g.*, Tamilnad, Maharashtra, Karnataka) are those in which rival groups became the political custodians of regional patriotism. To the extent that local Communist leaders have, since 1953, minimized the manipulation of regional patriotism, they have relinquished what is perhaps the most potent political resource available to any party in India.

[3] The major Indian regional languages and the round-numbered 1951 census figures for each, in millions, are: Hindi, 150; Telugu, 33; Marathi, 27; Tamil, 26; Bengali, 25; Gujarati, 16; Kannada, 14; Malayalam, 13; Oriya, 13; and Assamese, 5; (*Census of India,* 1951, Paper No. 1, Languages, All-Indian Tables, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1954, pp. 6-7).

The Communist regime in the south Indian state of Kerala, most distant outpost of the central power, has felt most acutely the dilemma of Indian communism. The Chief Minister of Kerala, E.M.S. Nambudripad, can make an effective play to the gallery of his regional constituents when he says, as he did on the eve of his departure for the recent Twenty-first Soviet Party Congress, that he will sound out Premier Khrushchev on deals for Kerala's coir and pepper; [4] that he will see whether the Soviet assistance "now being increasingly given to India can be used for the economic development of our state also." [5] When he does so, however, nationalist eyebrows are raised throughout the rest of India. He can harp on the theme that the Nehru government discriminates against Kerala in food subsidies and development expenditures. But for all the plaudits thereby won in Kerala, he is cast in nationalist eyes as a sectionalist.

Forging a Propaganda Myth

The dilemma confronting Indian communism is not a new one: Soviet and Indian Communist policy have from the beginning shown a recognition of the peculiar importance of India's multi-lingual character and of the need for a Soviet propaganda image and a local Communist line fashioned accordingly. Thus the Soviets have consistently attempted to convince Asians not only that "we solved the national question," but indeed that only the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist scriptures are addressed to the special challenge of organizing for rapid economic development in a multi-lingual state. To a great extent the attractive power of the Soviet propaganda image in India—and Indonesia as well—can be explained precisely in these terms. It is commonly said that the example of the undeveloped Soviet Union mobilizing its resources in the short space of forty years is compelling to Asians. But it is little recognized that the record of economic achievement is seen in close conjunction with the fact that the Soviet Union, too, confronted the challenge of national consolidation that now faces the new multi-lingual states of Asia.

It was natural for the Soviets, with their own nationality problem, to perceive the unique sensitivity and importance of the multi-lingual stresses in other societies, and consequently to foresee the important role that Soviet nationality policy would play as a future propaganda symbol in Asia. As early as 1922, Lenin declared:

This is a worldwide question, without exaggeration, a worldwide question. Here one must be arch-strict. This applies

[4] *Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, January 20, 1958, p. 1.
[5] *Times of India,* Bombay, January 16, 1958, p. 3.

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to India, to the East; here it is necessary to be careful a thousand times over.[6]

Again, in a letter attacking "Great Russian chauvinism," Lenin declared that it would be "unforgivable opportunism if, on the eve of the emergence of the East and at the beginning of its awakening, we should undermine our prestige there with even the slightest rudeness or injustice to our own minorities." [7]

With Lenin's support, Stalin took a similar stand when the status of national minorities figured in the debate on the form of the new Soviet constitution at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923. Western-oriented Bolsheviks such as Rakhovsky and Bukharin wanted a constitution which would impress European onlookers, especially the Germans. But Stalin countered that it mattered much more to impress the East by giving proper constitutional status to the Eastern peoples within the Soviet state who are "organically linked to India and China." Even the very decision to name the Soviet state "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" rather than "Russian Union of Socialist Republics" was taken only on Stalin's initiative. Elaborating his position, Stalin wrote:

The fact of the matter is that the whole East regards our union of republics as an experiment station. Either we shall, within the union, find a correct solution for the national problem in its practical application and establish truly fraternal relations and true collaboration between the peoples—in which case the entire East will see that our federation is the banner of its liberation, an advance guard, in whose steps it must follow—and that will be the beginning of the collapse of world imperialism; or we, the federation as a whole, shall commit errors, undermine the confidence of the formerly oppressed peoples in the proletariat of Russia, and deprive the union of republics of that power of attraction which it possesses in the eyes of the East—in which case imperialism will win and we shall lose.[8]

In a 1925 speech to Communist trainees for organizational work in Asia—a speech often cited by the Indian Communists ever since—Stalin looked ahead to an India in which many nations would emerge:

Now, India is talked about as one entity. But there can be hardly any doubt that in the case of a revolutionary upheaval in India, many hitherto unknown nationalities, each with its own distinctive culture, will emerge on the scene.[9]

CPI Espousal of the Soviet Line

For their part the Indian Communists displayed their awareness of the relevance of Soviet nationality doctrine for India long before the advent of independence. The draft program of the nascent Indian Communist Party in 1930 declared that only an "Indian Federal Soviet Republic would be capable of insuring to national minorities their right to self-determination, including that of complete separation." [10] The right to secede, however, was not made an active working part of the

[6] Z. Levina, "Great Role of V. I. Lenin in Organizing the Union of Soviet Republics," *Pravda,* July 11, 1955.

[7] Richard L. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union,* Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 42. Lenin looked on national tensions "as something to exploit, not something to solve," comments Pipes. One need hardly stress that, as soon as the Bolshevik Party consolidated its power, national aspirations were brought under the oppressive control of the centralized state. For a detailed discussion of this subject, see "Soviet Nationality Policy—Past and Present," including articles by Richard E. Pipes, Solomon Schwarz, and Uriel Weinreich, in *Problems of Communism,* Vol. II (1953), Nos. 5 and 6.

INDIAN LINGUISTIC AREAS

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[8] J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Works), Vol. pp. 236-58; 264-66.

[9] S. Dimanshtein, "Otnoshenie Marksizma—Leninizma k voprous ob assimiliatsii notsionalnostei," *Revoliutsii natsionalnosti,* Number 7, 1935, pp. 57-63.

[10] "Draft program of action of the Communist Party of India," *International Press Correspondence,* December 18, 1930. See also "Lessons of the Lahore Congress," *Revolutionary Age,* Berlin, February 1, 1930 (mimeographed).

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party program until Hindu-Moslem conflict began to overshadow all Indian political life in the latter 1930's. Indian Communist theoreticians then turned to nationality doctrine to find a rationale for supporting the Moslem League in its Pakistan demand. As late as 1938, confesses the Marathi Communist theoretician on nationality, G. Adhikari, "we were yet wrapped up in the theory, like the rest of the nationalists, that India was one nation and that the Moslems were just a religious minority." Many Indian Communists, he adds, were "shocked by the formulation that India was not one nation," but the party leadership overrode the dissenters in May 1941.[11] Later, at the historic "Quit India" session of the Congress Working Committee on August 8, 1942, Communist committee members came out against the majority demand for an immediate British withdrawal and called instead for prior agreement with the Moslem League.[12] The Communist line thenceforth urged Congress to concede "what is just and right" in the Pakistan demand. Wrote Adhikari in 1944:

The rational kernel of the Pakistan demand is that wherever people of the Moslem faith living together in a territorial unit form a nationality . . ., they certainly have the right to autonomous state existence just like other nationalities in India such as Andhras, Karnatakis, Marathis, and Bengalis.[13]

It was the Communist line on Pakistan which contributed as much as any other single factor to the ultimate wartime break between the Congress and the Communists. To be sure, the line on Pakistan was only part of the broader "people's war" line: the Communists were able to use it as a means of camouflaging their opposition to the Congress anti-war stand following Soviet entry into the conflict. But on top of the Communist line-up with the British, the alliance with the Moslem League was, in nationalist eyes, unforgivable. At the "Quit India" session, Nehru approved a Communist-inspired pledge that the future Indian Constitution "should be a federal one . . . with the residuary powers vesting in the units," [14] a concession which G. Adhikari boasted "came very near to recognizing the right of self-determination." [15] But this 1942 "victory" began a controversy with the official Congress leadership which ultimately resulted in Communist expulsion from the Congress. In December 1945, the Congress Working Committee voted to expel the eight Communist members of the All-India Congress Committee, and also directed the removal of all Communist Party members from Congress provincial committees and organs.[16] Nehru drafted a report which charged that "without doubt Communist support of the Moslem League's claim for Pakistan had added to the prevailing estrangement." [17] On the Communist side, Party Secretary P. C. Joshi went even further when he declared: "After all, the real issue which sharply divides us is not people's war but our advocacy of self-determination." [18]

Separatism and Independence

By the eve of India's independence in 1946, Communist leaders were sufficiently aware of sharpening regional consciousness to apply their new line with sweeping abandon to all regions and indeed to the entire future of the Indian Union. The Pakistan movement had occasioned their "advocacy of self-determination" in the first place, but the prospect of Congress rule in a free India now gave to the separatist line a new importance as a reservoir of strength against the day when the party's rivals would take power at the center. In the 1946 constituent assembly election campaign, the Communists demanded that power go, not to the provisional central government headed by Nehru, but to 14 sovereign regional constituent assemblies, each empowered to decide whether or not to join the new Indian Union. Joshi wrote:

The delegates to the all-India constituent assemblies should have no more authority than that of plenipotentiaries. Full and real sovereignty shall reside in the national constituent assemblies which will enjoy the unfettered right to negotiate, formulate and finally to decide their mutual relations within an independent India on the basis of complete equality.[19]

Nehru struck back sharply in a campaign speech to mill workers in Kanpur, declaring himself "greatly surprised at the treacherous attitude of the Indian Com-

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[11] G. Adhikari, *Pakistan and National Unity,* People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1944, p. 29.

[12] *Bombay Chronicle,* August 9, 1942, p. 1. See also *People's Age,* August 3, 1942, and *People's War,* September 20, 1942.

[13] *People's War,* October 15, 1944. See also Adhikari, *op. cit.,* p. 7, and *Party Letter,* October 16, 1943.

[14] Cited in P. C. Joshi, *Communist Reply to the Working Committee Charges,* People's Publishing House, Bombay, March 1946. See also Joshi, *Congress and the Communists,* People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1944, p. 25.

[15] Adhikari, *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[16] *National Herald,* Lucknow, December 14, 1945, p. 1. See also D. K. Rangekar, *The Congress-Communist Tangle,* National Youth Publications, Bombay, 1945, pp. 23-24.

[17] *National Herald,* December 15, 1945, p. 2.

[18] Joshi, *Communist Reply, op. cit.*

[19] Joshi, *For the Final Bid to Power—Freedom Program of the Indian Communists,* People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1946, p. 7.

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munists, who want to create a dozen or perhaps more divisions of India." He added:

> The part that the Communist Party has played during recent years has no relation with communism, and if there is any party which has done the maximum harm to the cause of communism, it is the Communist Party of India which has by its treacherous policy isolated itself from the masses.[20]

Nehru's attack was backed up during the campaign by a series of sharp denunciations of the Communists published in the *National Herald,* in which Nehru and members of his family then held a controlling interest. Reviewing a book by P. C. Joshi, the paper declared: "The Communists know that Britain will never get out of India unless she is kicked out. But before that, let India be divided into bits so that the Indian National Congress may end . . . leaving the Communists free to make a revolutionary conquest of India part by part. Thus would Comrade P. C. Joshi become the Stalin of the Indian Soviet Republic." [21] Another writer for the paper, speculating on the postwar Soviet role in Asia, looked Moscow squarely in the eye:

> It would not at all suit the USSR to have one or two big powerful neighbors to the South. A big country like India or China cannot be "persuaded" against her will to become a sphere of influence. On the contrary, it would insist on becoming an equal and a big world power. Together China and India can successfully resist any onslaught from the North or from the Anglo-Saxons. The emergence of a strong India or China is therefore not at all conducive to present Soviet plans of expansion. Pakistan would provide the best means for penetrating India's body politic . . . a small and weak state.
>
> In fact Soviet and Communist policy . . . has opted in favor of splitting the country into many autonomous units. They deny that there is any such thing as an Indian nation. The Communist plan appears to be for a Balkanization of India.[22]

Despite these attacks, the CPI, in its memorandum to the British cabinet mission in April 1946, set forth its position in unmistakably explicit terms:

> The provisional government should be charged with the task of setting up a boundary commission to redraw boundaries on the basis of natural ancient homelands of every people. The people of each such unit should have the unfettered right of self-determination . . . Delegates elected from each national unit shall decide by a majority whether they will join the all-India constituent assembly to form an Indian union, or remain out and form a separate sovereign state by themselves, or join another Indian union.[23]

The memorandum envisaged four units in what is now Pakistan (Western Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and Pathanland), a sprawling north Indian Hindustan, and twelve other regions which presently are embraced in the Indian Union—Tamilnad, Andhra, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujerat, Rajasthan, Punjab, Bihar, Assam, Bengal and Orissa.

The Linguistic States Movement

When the terms of independence had been decided and sovereign statehood had been conceded to Pakistan, the Indian Communists readdressed their line to the regional components of the new Indian Union, in particular to the widespread demand for separate unilingual states in place of existing multi-lingual units. In June 1947, the party Central Committee demanded that the constitution of the projected Nehru regime grant "national self-determination on the basis of linguistically demarcated provinces." [24] Then, when the Second Party Congress met at Calcutta in February 1948, the victorious anti-Joshi faction led by the new Party Secretary, B. T. Ranadive, emphasized—even while voicing dismay at the previous leadership's alliance with the Moslem League—that the broader slogan of self-determination remained "fundamentally sound." [25] The March post-congress manifesto of the new party Central Committee called for "self-determination to nationalities, including the right of secession." [26] The designation of Hindi as India's federal language was attacked as the act of an "oppressor" majority comparable to the "Great Russian" policy of Czarist days.[27]

The Indian Communist Party thus openly avowed its separatist intentions at the very outset of India's inde-

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[20] *National Herald,* March 9, 1946, p. 1.

[21] *Ibid.,* January 6, 1946 (reviewing P. C. Joshi, *A Free. Happy India,* People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1945).

[22] Kautilya, "Pakistan, Russia and the Communists," *ibid.,* February 10, 1946. See also issue of April 7 (p. 4) and April 11 editorial, "Russia and Pakistan."

[23] *Memorandum* (of the CPI to the British cabinet mission) April 16, 1946 (mimeographed). See also CPI Central Committee resolution, "Declaration of Independence—Communist resolution for the Constituent Assembly," published in *People's Age,* December 15, 1956, p. 1

[24] *People's Age,* June 29, 1947, p. 7.

[25] *Fighting Front of the Toiling Millions.* (Review of the Second CPI Congress), CPI publication, Bombay, March 1948, p. 21.

[26] *Toward the democratic front to win real independence and people's democracy* (Statement of policy of the CPI Central Committee) CPI publication, March 1948, p. 11.

[27] Ram Bilas Sharma, "On the language question in India—an article for discussion," *The Communist,* September-October, 1949, p. 47; also *Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the new Constitution,* People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1949, p. 4.

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pendent national existence. In so doing, the party followed the Soviet Union's own current line on India, which, if anything, showed even less respect for Indian nationalist sensitivities. Until 1953, when the line was changed, the governing Soviet interpretation of Indian nationality was Academician A. M. Diakov's 1948 tract, *The National Question and British Imperialism in India.* Praising Stalin's prescience for having seen India's "many-sided facets behind the outward national unity," Diakov at the outset declared his intention to show the peculiarities of India's "separate nationalities." He continued:

By virtue of the fact that India has for two hundred years been a colony of England in the eyes of the outside world, India appears as something unified and its entire population as one people . . . The presence in India of a powerful national liberating movement in which all the peoples living in India participate in this or that degree still further strengthens this illusion of a national unity of the entire Indian people. It is more or less broadly known that in India there are different religions . . . that there are a great number of castes, but few know that in India there is a number of large peoples, each of which is no less numerous than the English, the French, or the Italians; that these people are distinguished by their individual culture, language, literature, have their own mores and customs, their national character, have passed a long road of historical development. The colonial position of India which made its peoples slaves of English imperialism has depersonalized it in the eyes of the outside world.

Diakov concludes that India, with "neither a common language nor a common national character," cannot be considered one nation, and he adds the gratuitous statement that the common cultural fund which has developed in India "is no greater than the common cultural fund of the different peoples of Europe, of the Far East, and of the Middle East." [28]

Separatism in Action: Telengana

The best-known regional example of the pre-1953 separatist line followed by the Indian Communists was the Andhra party's guerrilla movement in the Telugu-speaking southeast corner of Hyderabad state. Insurgent Communists, voicing slogans of land reform and regional autonomy, organized village governments policed by their own terrorist nightriders, and the writ of Hyderabad and New Delhi meant little or nothing in the area for nearly two years. Not until 1951 did the Nehru Government crush separatism in Telengana, thus relieving one of the gravest strains in early Indo-Soviet relations. The Telengana movement is often represented as a pure and simple instance of Communist exploitation of the widespread land hunger in the less-developed countries. But it was the Telugu regional consciousness which gave the movement its special *élan* and which was no doubt a decisive consideration in the Communists' selection of Telengana as the territorial base for a challenge to New Delhi. Telengana and the adjacent Telugu-speaking districts of coastal Andhra were at that time divided between Hyderabad and Madras states. In agitating for linguistic reunion, the Telugu region set the pace for the agitation then current throughout India for a linguistic redemarcation of state boundaries. Although regional units of the Congress, and indeed of all parties, also contributed to this agitation, they did so against the wishes of Nehru, who hoped to postpone linguistic redemarcation as long as possible. The Communists, on the other hand, had license to outdo all the rest in their articulation of the linguistic demand.

By 1951, the Communists had taken effective leadership of the linguistic states movement in Andhra and

Sentiments Worthy of Emulation?

From speeches at the 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party:

The love of the Turkmen people for the great Russian people for their selfless aid was well expressed by the Turkmen poet Rakhmet Seydov: "Our teacher and brother! You were the first to open widely your embrace for the Turkmens, and we gave you our heart like brothers and in turn received your heart."—*D. D. Karayev, First Secretary of the Turkmen CP.*

If Azerbaijan has now become a progressive Soviet socialist republic . . . it owes this to the unfailing application of the wise Leninist nationalities policy . . . and to the brotherly assistance of the great Russian people who have won the unlimited respect and affection of all the workers of the world. (Applause)—*Imam Mustafayev, First Secretary of the Azerbaijani CP.*

The Uzbek nation owes its happy present and still finer future . . . to the ever strengthening, indissoluble brotherly friendship of the nations of the USSR headed by the elder brother—the great Russian people! (Applause)—*S. Kamalov, First Secretary of the Uzbek CP.*

[28] *Natsionalnyi vopros i angliiskii imperialism v Indii,* State Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1952.

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Kerala, and in all regions their propaganda on this issue, more than any other, placed the Congress on the defensive in the 1951 election campaign. Significantly, however, the party at this point no longer made explicit the demand for the right of secession of aggrieved regions which was still implicit in the party line on nationality. All that the party now demanded was linguistic autonomy within the Union. The Telengana Communists had surrendered their arms as part of a frank bargain in which the central government, for its part, granted the party legal status in the elections. But, as the *Draft Program* adopted by the Politbureau in time for the campaign showed,[29] the Telengana settlement had on the Communist side involved the surrender of more than arms. Both the program and the accompanying *Statement of Policy*[30] stopped at the linguistic states demand, clearly presaging the coming 1953 about-face on nationality. Underlying this shift was the fact that the nationalist-separatist dilemma had become aggravated as the party attempted to strike election alliances. In negotiating with nationalist-minded groups, the lingering ambiguity of the party line on nationality proved embarrassing, and the increasingly influential moderate faction of the party pressed hard for jettisoning separatism entirely. Even the linguistic states demand, stated as it still was in 1951 by many party leaders in terms bordering on secessionism, frightened some potential party allies among the anti-Congress opposition.

AFTER THE 1951 ELECTIONS, the newly-elected leader of the Communist bloc in the lower house of Parliament, A. K. Gopalan of Kerala, exultantly described the formation of linguistic provinces as "India's most important problem, the Communists' No. 1 goal."[31] He issued a sweeping invitation to other opposition groups to join the Communists in a joint parliamentary front, listing as the second plank in a proposed common platform "immediate formation of linguistic national states . . . wider provincial autonomy."[32] It was this emphasis on "wider autonomy," on top of linguistic reorganization as such, which was primarily responsible for the decision of Acharya J. B. Kripalani's *Kisan Mazdoor Praja* (Peasants', Workers', People's) Party to decline membership in the front. The main difference between the Communists and the KMPP, as *The Statesman* reported at the time, came in "the approach to the problem of 'linguistic autonomy,' which was emphasized in the draft program circulated by the Communist Party. Most KMPP members appear to consider this move as a danger to national unity."[33]

Despite this rebuff, the Communists promptly proceeded to cast themselves as the only true friends of linguistic provinces. Communist deputies stalked out of Parliament on one occasion to protest the delivery of speeches in Hindi, and then rallied 77 votes for a resolution demanding linguistic reorganization.[34] In December 1952, Communist agitators made the fast unto death of an Andhra Gandhian leader (for a separate linguistic state) the occasion for a frenzy of rioting and mob destruction—resulting in the central government's surrender first to Andhra demands and eventually to demands for a general reorganization of states. By 1954 Nehru had, under pressure, appointed a States Reorganization Commission which was eventually to propose a new map of India based in large part on language boundaries.

Switch to National Unity

From the Communist standpoint, however, Nehru's accession to the appointment of the commission was most inopportunely timed. It was a bitter irony that, at the very moment when the clamor of contending regions reached its highest pitch since independence, the exigencies imposed by the changing tenor of Indo-Soviet relations compelled the Indian Communists to accent Indian unity. By late 1953, Stalin's successors had decided to reckon with the Indian Union as an established fact, and the avowed separatist policies of the Indian Communists clearly required modification. In this case, the doctrinal flexibility built into the nationality weapon made it less awkward than usual to reverse the party line. But it must have tested even the aplomb of Ajoy Ghosh, who by then had become Party Secretary, to stand before the Third Indian Party Congress at Madura in December 1953, and feign shame that "in the past, many a time we scoffed at the concept of Indian unity and glorified separatism." In campaigning for linguistic provinces, said Ghosh, "bourgeois-nationalist deviations have been allowed to penetrate our own ranks. . . . The unity of the toiling masses is the most precious thing." He added that the 1951 Program had been correct in pledging that

[29] *Draft Program of the Communist Party of India,* CPI publication, Bombay, April 1951.

[30] *Statement of Policy of the Communist Party of India,* CPI publication, Bombay, May 1951.

[31] *Times of India,* May 26, 1952.

[32] *Minimum Program for United Democratic Front* (mimeographed), issued by "The Communist MP's and MC's," New Delhi, April 25, 1952.

[33] "The Political Scene—a still-born parliamentary opposition," *The Statesman,* May 17, 1952, p. 6.

[34] *The Hindu,* July 13, 1952.

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the use of Hindi "will not be obligatory," but emphasized:

> . . . at the same time, we have to realize that the Communist Party stands for the unity of India. . . . Hindi is to be encouraged as the language for communication between governments and peoples in different provinces . . . Where Hindi is not spoken, the party, while upholding the rights of the national language, must also encourage and popularize Hindi.[35]

This reversal necessitated a spate of explanatory polemics rationalizing the support of Hindi which was now written into the new party program. What the Third Congress had decided, wrote the party's Bengali theoretician on nationality, S. N. Mazumdar, was actually only a reasonable response to extremists at both ends of the spectrum—on the one hand, those who would impose Hindi at the expense of the regional languages, on the other those who would deny any status to Hindi. No longer should Hindi and the regional languages be viewed as deadly rivals. Mazumdar then blithely defined the new line in terms indistinguishable from the Congress orthodoxy:

> In a multi-lingual country like India, there must be a medium of intercourse. . . . In reality, there is not and should not be any conflict between the federal language and the regional languages. Their spheres of action are different, and each can fulfill its functions without encroaching on the sphere of the other. Given a proper and correct understanding of their respective roles, they can enrich one another.[36]

On January 26, 1955, India's annual Republic Day, *Pravda* signalled in an historic editorial that Soviet policy had completed its own 180-degree revolution—from condemnation of Nehru as an imperialist ally to praise of his "outstanding statesmanship" and of India as "a peace-loving state upholding its national independence." Later, *Pravda* also embraced the CPI line on Hindi in its greeting to an Indian Parliament delegation:

> As yet, English is the main language used in parliament, as this is the only language comprehensible to all deputies. However, the use of one of the languages of India—Hindi—is receiving more and more encouragement from the Indian Government, and deputies frequently deliver speeches in Hindi.[37]

The CPI Central Committee, following Nehru's triumphant tour of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1955, moved to adapt the party line still further to the new turn in Indo-Soviet relations. The committee passed a comprehensive resolution on the Indian scene which made not a single reference to linguistic states, or even to the States Reorganization Commission which then was touring the country.[38] Although the party has vigorously promoted the present movement for the linguistic division of Bombay State—which the Reorganization Commission left an uneasy union of Gujarati and Marathi territories—the Communists, in so doing, have merely joined in what has been a Donnybrook for all parties.

The Outlook

Given the progressive demoralization of non-Communist political forces, it is entirely possible that the Indian Communists will adhere to their present nationalist line in the hope that Communist rather than Congress leadership will come out on top in future political reshuffles. Certainly the present Indian Communist line is an unequivocal appeal to nationalist united front sentiment. Ajoy Ghosh has declared that the Congress is now too rotten a structure to hold India together and that "the unity of India can today be maintained only by strengthening the Communist Party and democratic forces."[39] And the party Central Committee (meeting after the return of the CPI delegation from Moscow) has announced its "broad agreement" with the economic policy objectives adopted at the recent Congress convention in Nagpur[40]: continued importance for the public sector in industrial development, control of the wholesale food-grains trade by state governments, and enactment by the end of 1959 of legislation fixing ceilings on land holdings. At a time of growing cleavage within the Congress on these issues, the Central Committee has appealed to "all progressive elements, including Congressmen" for "unity of action . . . at the execution stage" in getting the Nagpur resolutions "implemented effectively and democratically."[41] Should this appeal result in significant Congress defections to local Communist fronts, the Indian Communists may indeed stake their all on nationalism.

In the short run, the nationalist line permits the coexistence of a Communist order in Kerala and a Congress-controlled central government and thus, in the present Indian political setting, has much to recommend

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[35] Ajoy Ghosh, "On the work of the Third Party Congress," *New Age,* January 25, 1954, p. 13.

[36] S. N. Mazumdar, "Stalin's work on linguistics," *New Age,* April 1954, p. 76.

[37] O. Orestov, *Pravda,* May 10, 1955, p. 3, cited in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 22, 1955, p. 14.

[38] *Communist Party in the struggle for peace, democracy and national advance* (Resolution of the CPI Central Committee), CPI Publication, New Delhi, June 1955.

[39] *New Age,* April 13, 1958, p. 13.

[40] *The Times of India,* Jan. 9, 1959, p. 1.

[41] *The Hindustan Times,* Feb. 26, 1959, p. 1.

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it from the Communist standpoint. But for all its surface restraint at a time when Nehru presides over a unified Indian state, the Indian Communist line on nationality remains an open-ended one capable of being altered on short notice to suit changing domestic and international circumstances. The Indian Communists have never fully relinquished the nationality weapon's most potent ammunition—the assertion of each "nation's" right to secede from the Indian Union. The right of secession has not been an advertised part of Indian Communist policy since its pointed omission from the 1951 election manifesto. But it is as implicit as ever. Kerala's Nambudripad, in the party's last published word on the matter, qualified the right but did not deny it. "The right of secession," he wrote in explanation of its omission from the 1951 manifesto, "should not be confused with the expediency of the formation of separate states." It remains in each instance "for the working class and its allies in every nation to decide . . . Hence, though for India too, the principle of self-determination means and naturally includes the right of separation, it is inexpedient for Indian nationalities to exercise the right." [42]

As Chief Minister of India's only Communist-governed state, Nambudripad is uniquely situated among Indian Communists to trigger the secessionist weapon, and he has often made it seem, in his contentious encounters with New Delhi, that his trigger finger itches most severly. He might well wonder how long the Indian Communists can continue to perform what Socialist leader Asoka Mehta has termed "the incredible feat of articulating the regional feelings of different regions which are often conflicting and generally exclusive." [43]

The dilemma is real, and the fact that Nambudripad happens to be identified at present with the "soft" line within Indian communism has relatively little to do with the quandary. The critical issue which divides the Indian Communists is not, to take the Kerala case, whether Nambudripad and his colleagues should or should not man the barricades to maintain themselves in power—in the event, let us say, of a victorious Congress-led coalition there in the 1962 elections. The significance of a decision to man the barricades in this or a similar set of circumstances in any region would be that it implemented a more basic decision to break loose from the present Communist commitment to the Indian Constitution and to a bid for centralized power in New Delhi. It would signify Nambudripad's determination to deal with Moscow and Peking over the head of Premier Nehru no matter what the cost in nationalist alienation. And the only basis for such a decision would be the fateful judgment that India is in for a period of political disarray in which every party in every region will be on its own.

[42] "Questions and Answers: Nationalities and the Right of Secession," *Crossroads* (former CPI weekly), Sept. 6, 1953, p. 10.

[43] "The Political Mind of India," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1957.

The Communists and Indian Labor

By Brij Mohan Toofan

EVER SINCE THE START of organized Communist activity in India in the 1920's, the capture of undivided control of the labor movement has been the first-priority objective of the Indian Communists. Yet, because of the party's kaleidoscopic changes of line which so often in the past have demonstrated its greater loyalty to the interests of Moscow than to those of the Indian working class, Communist influence has proven, in actual fact, more instrumental than any other force in fomenting political disunity in the ranks of Indian labor.

Against this background, then, the rapid upsurge of Communist strength witnessed in the last few years in wide sectors of the Indian population, particularly the organized labor force, is the more disturbing. The explanation no doubt lies, in part, in political and psychological factors—among them, the Indian Communists' current (since 1953) tactical posture as a respectable,

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non-violent party of loyal parliamentary opposition, the impact of the post-1955 era of cordial Indo-Soviet governmental relations, and the profound impression made on the Indian popular mind by Soviet and Chinese Communist economic achievements.

From the particular standpoint of labor, however, more immediate economic factors have probably been decisive. Inflated living costs, food shortages, and the government's policy of holding down wage-levels as part of its efforts to curb inflationary pressures all have contributed to a mounting wave of labor unrest and dissatisfaction with the leadership of the ruling Congress Party and its affiliated labor organization, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC). Labor, particularly since early 1958, has been in an agitational mood and has been casting about for a more aggressive sponsorship of its demands.

The Communists have been quick to exploit this favorable climate. The violent strike which occurred in India's biggest steel enterprise—the Tata Iron and Steel Works at Jamshedpur—in May 1958 signalled the start of a series of widespread strike demonstrations initiated or aggressively supported by the Communists in response to labor's mood for action. At the same time, the Communist-dominated All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) stepped up the organizational activities of its many trained party cadres in the field in a vigorous effort to draw the workers into the unions under its control. The seriousness of the Communist challenge was fully acknowledged by INTUC's president, Mr. S. Vasavada, in a July 1958 statement admitting that "the Communists are making headway among the Indian working class," and that the supremacy hitherto enjoyed by INTUC in the labor field was already under threat from its Communist-dominated rival.[1] This admission was given concrete substantiation by membership figures reported to the Indian government last September by the four existing national labor federations. AITUC, which only seven months earlier (February 1958) had claimed an aggregate membership of 964,000 for its affiliated unions, now laid claim to a vastly expanded total of 1,455,000, as against the 1,403,000 members reported by INTUC.[2]

While AITUC's claimed figure undoubtedly exaggerates the truth, it must nevertheless be accepted as reflecting a significant shift of worker allegiance away from the Congress-oriented trade unions toward those accepting AITUC's Communist-inspired leadership. It is consequently much more than a mere academic question whether or not the Indian Communists are now nearing the final achievement of their longstanding ambition to bring the whole of India's organized labor force—some 4,000,000 strong—under the unified control of the party. One vital factor affecting the answer undoubtedly will be the stability, or instability, of the party's current "popular" line—that is, whether the party leadership can keep up its facade of parliamentary moderation and espousal of national interests, or on the contrary will be propelled, under the compulsion either of a new tactical shift decreed by Moscow or of internal political changes, upon a course that will once again alienate labor support. From this standpoint, it is useful to look back over communism's past record in the Indian labor movement as a basis for judging future prospects.

Early Communist Penetration

At the close of World War I, Indian trade unionism remained essentially what it had been from its inception in 1875—a reformist movement largely untouched by political radicalism. Inspired by the principles of 19th-century English Chartism, it had devoted itself exclusively to seeking improved working conditions and other social reforms benefiting urban labor, and only after 1908, when the British government's arrest of an Indian nationalist leader precipitated a spontaneous six-day strike, did it begin to take on a political coloring. Thereafter the trade union movement was characterized by a growing element of anti-British nationalism, much intensified by the hardships of the war period, but its political outlook still continued to be fundamentally reformist rather than revolutionary. When the All-India Trade Union Congress was first formed in 1920, its founders were Indian National Congress leaders who were "radical" perhaps in the nationalist sense, but certainly not in their political ideology.[3]

The Russian Revolution of 1917, with its slogans of political, economic and social equality and particularly of anti-imperialism, naturally fired the imagination of politically-conscious Indian intellectuals and labor leaders. But it was for the most part outside India, among the often radically-minded groups of Indian political émigrés and students in various European capitals and elsewhere, that the Communist ideology gained its first strong converts. Foremost among them were Shapurji

[1] *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, July 11, 1958.

[2] These figures were mentioned by the Indian Labor Minister in a statement in parliament last September. He indicated that the Labor Ministry was investigating their accuracy.

[3] N. M. Joshi, *Trade Union Movement in India,* Aryabhushan Press, Poona, 1927.

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Saklatwala in London (elected to the British Parliament in 1922), and M. N. Roy in Berlin, who became the Comintern's chief advisers on Indian affairs during the early 1920's, as well as its principal intermediaries for transmitting guidance, instructions and money to the small number of Communist converts seeking to organize the movement on Indian soil.

For their part, the Bolshevik leaders in Moscow were quick to evince a keen interest in promoting the Indian movement as part of their strategic plan for carrying the Communist revolution into the colonial and "semi-colonial" countries of Asia. At its Second Congress in 1920, the Comintern formulated special tactical policies for these areas, instructing the local Communist parties or groups to participate directly in the existing "bourgeois-democratic" movements of national liberation and to attempt to win control of their leadership.[4]

It was this early version of the united front formula which shaped the general course followed by the Indian Communists from 1921 to 1928. Just as the Chinese Communists joined forces with the Kuomintang in this period, so the Communists in India entered as individuals into the Indian National Congress, the organizational spearhead of the independence movement, and worked from within to swing it away from Gandhian policies of "non-violence" and passive "non-cooperation" toward greater political radicalism and aggressive revolutionary action. During half of this period the Communists operated without any separate party organization of their own; it was only in 1925 that the Communist Party of India (CPI) was established, on a covert basis, to ensure greater unity of effort.

Essentially the same tactics were employed by the Communists in the labor field. Although AITUC, at its second session in October 1921, had declined an invitation from the Moscow Red International of Labor Unions (RILU) to "join the new great world movement of international solidarity on absolutely equal terms," [5] the Communists entered it and, within the framework of a limited common front against imperialism, worked actively to "radicalize" the policies of its reformist leadership. Here too, as in the National Congress, the Communists' major effort was directed at combatting the dominant influence of Gandhism.

By 1925, however, it was apparent that the Indian Communists on their own were making little headway in trade union activity, and to remedy this both the Moscow RILU and the British Communist Party began sending a steady stream of trained labor organizers and party activists to India. Outstanding among these were two British Communists—Donald Campbell (alias George Allison), sent to India under direct orders from the RILU, and Philip Spratt, sent by the CPGB. Both men performed effective work during 1926-27 in organizing Communist-oriented unions among railway and textile workers in the Bombay and Bengal areas, and also were instrumental in provoking a number of strikes, including one on the Bengal-Nagpur Railway.

Encouraged by these successes, the Communists intensified their labor offensive in 1928. A record number of strikes, in a majority of which the Communists played a leading role, cost a loss of nearly 32 million man-days in this single year—more than in the five preceding years combined.[6] More than two thirds of this total was caused by a six-month general strike of Bombay textile workers, largely engineered by Communist union leaders. Though not highly successful, the strike swung appreciable support from the moderate to the Communist-controlled unions, and this in turn gave the Communists increased strength within the AITUC national organization.

The United Front Scrapped

It was just at this juncture, when the Indian Communists at last seemed to be getting somewhere by means of united front tactics in the labor field, that the Sixth Comintern Congress, meeting at Moscow in July-August 1928, resolved to scrap these tactics in favor of all-out class struggle against the "bourgeois-nationalists" in control of the independence movements. In its "Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies," adopted at its concluding session on September 1, the Congress called upon the Indian Communists to "mercilessly expose the national reformist leaders and carry on a decisive struggle for the conversion of the trade unions into genuine class organizations of the proletariat." [7]

The narrow sectarianism of the new tactical line proved as disastrous for the Communists in India as for their party comrades in many other countries—though

[4] See Theses of the Second Comintern Congress "On the National and Colonial Questions" in J. Degras, *The Communist International*, 1919-1943, Oxford University Press (London), 1956, Vol. I, pp. 138-44.

[5] Red International of Labor Unions Report, "Moscow Greetings to the Second Session of the AITUC," October 27, 1921.

[6] Figure given in official report to the British government, cited in S. D. Punekar, *Trade Unionism in India*, New Book Company, Bombay, 1948, p. 93.

[7] *Report on Proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International*, published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, 1929.

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not, perhaps, as much as in Germany where it led the Communists to throw their support to the Nazis in the April 1931 referendum for the overthrow of the Social Democratic government of Prussia, thus paving the way for Hitler's rise to power.[8] In India the Communists subordinated the fight against imperialism to their private war on the "national reformists," their erstwhile allies: ignoring their own weakness, they heaped abuses upon Gandhi and thus cut themselves off from the mainstream of the Indian popular movement.

The new tactics applied in the labor field were equally disruptive and suicidal. India was suffering the impact of world economic depression; factories were closing down and unemployment was mounting. Yet the Communists, egged on by Moscow's demand for aggressive action, persisted in inciting strikes which had no chance of success but instead often gave the employers an excuse for retaliating with wage-cuts and thus breaking the increasingly demoralized and disunited unions. In fact, the Communists in this period used the strike weapon more as a cut-throat tactic against the reformist segment of the trade union movement than as a means to obtain concessions for labor. They were aided in this by the fact that some employers, fearing the genuine trade unionism of the moderate elements more than the politically-motivated action of the Communists, were willing to connive with the latter against the reformist-led unions. The result was a number of "deals" between the Communists and employers aimed at smashing the Communists' trade union rivals.[9]

The inevitable climax of the Communist-reformist war-to-the-death came at the 10th AITUC session at Nagpur in November 1929. Upon learning that the Communists intended to press for the adoption of certain party-inspired proposals, including one for AITUC's formal affiliation with the strongly Communist-influenced League Against Imperialism,[10] the moderate trade union leaders boycotted the session, leaving it dominated by the Communists and the radical nationalist wing. The Communists thus were able to put through the affiliation motion and to obtain heavy representation in the leadership, which sealed the final withdrawal of the moderates from AITUC to form their own National Trade Union Federation in 1930. The disintegration of the united labor front became complete in 1931 when the Communists ended their collaboration with the radical nationalists and quit AITUC themselves to form an exclusively Communist organization, the "Red TUC."

Meanwhile, the Communists' openly aggressive tactics had spurred the British authorities, in March 1929, to arrest virtually all the top party and Communist trade union leaders, who were subsequently tried and sentenced on charges of conspiracy against the British crown. Writing of the mistaken Communist tactics of this period, the Indian Socialist Madhu Limaye quotes an interesting party document revealing the CPI's blind subordination of the workers' interests to its fight against the reformists:

In 1933, the AITUC met at Kanpur. Old party comrades know we had our own Red TUC and had condemned the AITUC as [a] reformist and reactionary [organization], which had to be smashed up. At that time our party was rabidly sectarian. Joshi [P. C. Joshi, later General Secretary of the CPI] came from Bombay to Kanpur with the General Secretary's instructions saying that a handbill should be issued exposing the AITUC as a pack of reformists and reactionaries. We had already one handbill of this nature. We had made 25,000 copies of another handbill to be distributed the next day in the open session.[11]

The "People's Front"

By the time the Seventh Comintern Congress convened in July 1935, the miserable failure of the sectarian tactical line was only too apparent, not only in India but throughout the international Communist movement. On top of this, the threat to the Soviet Union presented by the rising power of the Nazi-Fascist alliance in Europe underscored the bankruptcy of the Sixth Congress policies and the need for a new phase of united front tactics to back up Soviet diplomatic efforts for collective security and the formation of a "peace bloc" against fascism. The new general line laid down for India and other colonial areas therefore called for the revival of Communist participation in the national independence movements, but this time with heavier emphasis on alliances with their left-wing elements under the slogan of a "people's front" against fascism and imperialism. Georgi Dimitrov, Chairman of the Comintern, further expounded the application of the line to trade union activity in these terms:

We are for one union in each industry, for one federation of trade unions in each country . . . [and] for one international federation of trades unions . . . based on class struggle. . . .

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[8] Hugh Seton Watson, *From Lenin to Malenkov,* Praeger, New York, 1953, p. 109.

[9] B. Shiva Rao, "Trade Unionism in India," *Indian Textile Journal,* January 1941, p. 47.

[10] The League Against Imperialism was organized at the Conference of Oppressed Nationalities, held at Brussels in 1927.

[11] *Communist Party—Facts and Fiction,* Chetana Prakashan, Hyderabad (Deccan), 1951, p. 23. See also *Open Forum,* published by Bengal Party Headquarters, No. 12, 1950.

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Our one condition for uniting the trade unions is: struggle against capital, struggle against fascism and internal trade union democracy.[12]

In compliance with this directive, the Indian Communists dissolved their Red TUC and brought the unions affiliated with it back into AITUC. The return of the Communists was followed in 1938 by the re-entry of the moderates who had formed the National Trade Union Federation in 1930, so that once again AITUC became the sole national organization of the working class. Meanwhile, the Communists also re-entered the ranks of the Indian National Congress and its extreme left-wing component, the Congress Socialist Party (formed in 1934)—the more eagerly because the CPI itself still remained legally outlawed. By 1938 they had succeeded in capturing key positions in the leaderships of both the Congress Socialist Party and AITUC. The latter, in fact, was now headed by the veteran Communist trade union leader, S. A. Dange.

As defined by the Seventh Comintern Congress, however, the new tactics of the "people's front" in India were also to include the use of disguised methods of infiltration and sabotage from within for the purpose of undermining the "right-wing" National Congress leadership. Consequently, when the National Congress—after winning the first (1937) elections under the Government of India Act—formed ministries in most of the provinces, the Communists, virtually in command of AITUC, began efforts to discredit the Congress administrations by again fomenting widespread strikes which they sought to pass off as spontaneous expressions of labor unrest.[13] One of the largest was the Bombay Protest Strike of November 1938 involving 90,000 workers, which was followed by others in Cawnpore, Ahmedabad, Bombay and Bengal. Despite the hostile political motivation of these actions, the Congress ministries nevertheless released all Communist leaders who were still serving the prison sentences imposed on them in the early 1930's.

The conclusion of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact, swiftly followed by the outbreak of war in Europe, did not alter the general united front approach of the Indian Communists, although the emphasis promptly shifted from "anti-fascism"—Hitler now being a friend of the Soviet Union—to "anti-imperialist war," meaning opposition to any Indian support of the British war effort. While maintaining the united front, however, the CPI felt itself so strongly entrenched within the Congress and AITUC that it began intensifying its pressure on the other Congress groups and asserting an independent, near-revolutionary anti-war line indicative of its ambition to stand alone as the champion of the Indian masses. This new aggressiveness in wartime gave the British authorities justification for prompt reprisals, and no less than 750 leading members of the Communist and Socialist parties were arrested and later sent to Deoli concentration camp in central India.

The Great Betrayal

Hitler's June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, which made Stalin Britain's ally in the war, placed the Indian Communists in an acutely awkward predicament. Sharp controversy broke out among the Communist leaders interned at Deoli, but was finally resolved by a letter from Harry Pollitt, head of the British Communist Party. The letter advised that the official party line was henceforth to be that the war was not, after all, an "imperialist war" as the party had mistakenly maintained up till then, but a "people's war" requiring full Communist support. By the end of 1941, the Indian Communists had declared their full acceptance of the new line, and six months later the British authorities pronounced the party legal for the first time and released the Communist leaders from detention. Only about a month thereafter, in August 1942, the National Congress adopted, over strong Communist opposition, its resolution calling upon the British to "quit India," an action which resulted in its own illegalization and the jailing of its leaders in place of the now liberated Communists.[14]

The party's cynical betrayal of the national aspirations of which it had posed as the stoutest champion had its most severe impact upon the Indian working class. At a time when the workers' bargaining position was at its highest, the Communists completely abandoned their prewar militancy in the labor movement and took advantage of their unchallenged supremacy in the AITUC organization to prevent the workers from striking in support of legitimate economic demands, and even to break strikes which occurred in defiance of AITUC

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[12] *The United Front Against War and Fascism,* Communist Party publication, 1935.

[13] In 1937, a total of 379 strikes involving 676,000 workers occurred, causing a loss of 8,983,000 man-days. See R. Palme Dutt, *India Today,* People's Publishing House, Ltd., Bombay, 1949, p. 395.

[14] In a letter published in the *Bombay Chroncle,* March 17, 1942, Soli Batlivala, a defected Communist official, claimed that the Communists had offered the British authorities "unconditional help" in arresting "the underground workers of the other political parties" who hampered the war effort.

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orders. Despite mounting inflation which caused a rapid drop in the workers' standard of living, a Communist Party resolution flatly declared that the Communists "take a bold and open stand against strikes as they injure the defense of the country by holding up production." [15]

A statistical report issued by the Labor Ministry of the Government of India in 1945 graphically bears out the hardship suffered by the Indian workers as a result of the wartime Communist labor policies. According to the report, the average per capita real earnings of organized industrial workers declined from 287.5 rupees in the 1939-40 fiscal year to 212.6 rupees in 1943-44, and the percentage of total wages to total industrial income dropped from 31 to 21 percent over the same period. At the same time, the report shows, annual net profits in all the major industries except coal showed substantial (in some cases huge) increases.[16] In sharp contrast to this situation, the real wages of British workers during the war period rose significantly.

But in spite of their betrayal of the workers, the Indian Communists were able to keep and even tighten their grip on AITUC by virtue of the simple fact that all the opposition trade union leaders to whom the workers might have turned for a defense of their interests were in jail. The outward unity of the trade union movement under Communist control was, however, only a surface appearance. Beneath it resentment against the Communists was steadily building up in the ranks of labor not only because the Communist policies were severely penalizing the workers, but because the party's actions for the first time gave open and unmistakable proof of its readiness to sacrifice Indian national interests to those of a foreign government.

From Vacillation to Violence

With the end of the war the CPI paid the price of its betrayal. Cut off by the National Congress which had again become the focal point of national political life, and distrusted by labor and the masses generally, the party cast about for a new line which would enable it to regain its influence. In the absence of any clearcut guidance from Moscow, however, Indian Communist policy from the return of peace until early 1948 was vacillating and ambivalent. On the one hand, the party sought to mend its breach with the Congress leaders—even with Gandhi—and to revive the prewar united front "against imperialism"; however, this line was deprived of much of its force by the new British Labor Government's announced decision to negotiate for India's independence. On the other hand, there were occasional manifestations of a tendency within the leadership toward more militant action, bolstered further by actual resorts to revolutionary violence by local Communist elements in the Madras and Telengana regions of South India. In the main, however, it was the conciliatory, united front line of the dominant faction in the central party leadership, led by General Secretary P. C. Joshi, which prevailed.

In the trade union field, the enforced unity of the war period quickly gave way to disintegration. The Communists, seeking to retain their control of AITUC, blocked the efforts of the released non-Communist trade union leaders to resume their place in the central organization, but the Socialists then attacked directly at the lower levels and managed to win the leaderships of a number of AITUC affiliates. In 1946 the All-India Railwaymen's Federation, the largest national railway workers' organization, passed under Socialist leadership, and was soon followed by the All-India Postmen and Lower-grade Staff Union, Ordnance Workers' Union, Dock Workers' Union, and Municipal Workers' Union. Subsequently, the Socialists formed their own central labor organization, the *Hind Mazdoor Sabha* (Indian Workers' League), or HMS.

IT WAS NOW the turn of the National Congress to become disturbed over the growth of Socialist strength in the trade unions, and in May 1947 it established a rival organization under its own "right-wing" political influence—the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC). This was followed by the formation of still another organization, the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC), grouping together politically unaffiliated trade unions. Thus, the postwar split-up of the Indian organized labor movement into four rival segments of divergent political orientations became complete.

With the final establishment of an independent India in August 1947, the CPI—still without any unequivocal new directive from Moscow—promptly pledged full support to the provisional Nehru Government and proclaimed, as its slogans in the trade union field, "Increase Production" and "Don't Foment Strikes." No sooner had the party embarked upon this line, however, than indications began to appear that Moscow was moving in exactly the opposite direction. At the first meeting of the newly-established Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov announced the termination of the

[15] Quoted in *Madhu Limaye, op. cit.*, pp. 48-9.

[16] *Ministry of Labor Report*, Government of India Press, 1945.

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Soviet honeymoon with the West; he accused the "imperialist powers" of still trying to keep India and other "colonial" areas in "political and economic bondage" and called for a sharpening of Communist "anti-imperialist" struggle in these areas.[17] Although Zhdanov failed to clarify the nature of the struggle, other authoritative clues from Moscow and elsewhere made clear to the CPI that it was expected to attack the Nehru government as representing the reactionary "bourgeois-landlord" class and as having "sold out to the imperialists." [18]

The new Moscow line provided the radical faction in the CPI leadership under B. T. Ranadive with the ammunition it needed to oust the Joshi faction from control. At the second Party Congress at Calcutta in February 1948, Ranadive captured the general secretaryship and won approval of new policies based on a three-class alliance (workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie) against the bourgeoisie proper, and envisaging wider use of revolutionary tactics along the line of the Telengana Communist revolt. The party immediately began organizing shock brigades and guerrilla bands for a double-pronged revolutionary campaign of urban proletarian struggle and peasant uprisings.

The Communist plan called for making a general railway workers' strike scheduled for March 9, 1948, the springboard for launching the main urban phase of the revolutionary struggle for power. However, the Socialist-led All-India Railwaymen's Federation, upon learning of the Communist intentions, came to terms with the railway authorities on its own economic demands and cancelled its participation in the strike. Some Communist union elements struck anyway, without success, and as a result nearly 600 Communists were rounded up by the police. Later in March, the party was declared illegal in West Bengal as a result of similar Communist-instigated labor disturbances there, and subsequently S. A. Dange, president of AITUC, and S. S. Mirajkar, Communist head of the Bombay provincial TUC (now mayor of Bombay), were arrested. Most of the strikes attempted by the Communists during the 1948-49 period were miserable failures, and the net result of the violent methods employed as well as the purely political motivation behind the disturbances was to nullify whatever progress the Communists had made since 1945 toward regaining the confidence of labor and of the people at large.

The Shift to Neo-Maoism

The disastrous consequences of Ranadive's "left sectarian" extremism had already set in motion strong currents of opposition within the CPI itself as early as mid-1948, and by the summer of 1949 it was evident that his policies were also out of step with a new shift of line in Moscow. This time the shift amounted, in effect, to Soviet abandonment of the narrow three-class "anti-capitalist" strategy of 1947, which had placed the bulk of the bourgeoisie in the enemy camp, and Moscow's approval instead of the Chinese "neo-Maoist" strategy as being the correct revolutionary path for Asian communism. As expounded by the Chinese party theoretician, Liu Shao-ch'i, neo-Maoism called for revolution in two stages, in the first of which—the "bourgeois-democratic" stage—the Communists must form a four-class united front embracing not only the petty bourgeoisie but also the "middle" or "national" bourgeois elements opposed to imperialism. In June 1949, Liu's formulation was fully publicized in *Pravda* and then sanctioned at a conference of Soviet Asian experts in Moscow.[19]

With Moscow's blessing, the new line was proclaimed binding for the Asian Communist parties at the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) conference at Peking in November 1949, but it was not until five months after Soviet approval of it had been explicitly restated in an editorial published in the Cominform organ *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (January 27, 1950) that the Ranadive faction, at a CPI Central Committee meeting in May-June 1950, finally surrendered to the Maoist-oriented Andhra faction of Rajeshwar Rao, who became party General Secretary. A statement issued by the new Politburo on this occasion declared:

> **The tradition of our party, especially since the "people's war" period, has been to swing like a pendulum from one extreme to the other. . . . We woke up suddenly like Rip Van Winkle at the end of 1947 [only] to jump into left sectarianism which has brought the party and the mass movement to the present plight of total disruption.[20]**

[17] John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India,* Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1956, pp. 28-9.

[18] The new line was set forth in an article by the authoritative Soviet Indian expert, E. M. Zhukov, published in Moscow in July 1947. See Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959, p. 254.

[19] Zhukov was the chief spokesman at the conference. For his statement, see E. M. Zhukov, *Problems of National and Colonial Struggle After the Second World War,* People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1950, pp. 1-11.

[20] Statement of the CPI Politburo, July 1950. See Kautsky, *op.cit.,* pp. 113-14.

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Actually, the Andhra faction itself was not fully in step with the new Moscow-Peking line, for while it was Maoist-oriented, it placed greater emphasis on the armed guerrilla warfare tactics of Maoism than on the peaceful four-class united front which was the heart of the neo-Maoist strategy then prescribed for India. Under further pressure from the British Communists, however, the Rao leadership at the end of 1950 took initial steps to revive the old united front slogan, calling for close collaboration among all leftist parties in all spheres of activity. In the trade union sphere, a party circular entitled "On the Key Tasks of the Trade Union Front and Trade Union Unity," stressed that whatever limited possibilities existed for legal action should be exploited with care and tact, but that the groundwork must also be laid for illegal activities by the revolutionary (Communist-led) unions.[21] Thus, the party planned on the one hand to keep intact an illegal trade union apparatus and, on the other, to promote a united labor front.

The Communist leadership of AITUC therefore invited all the other national labor federations to join with it in a "left unity." Both INTUC, affiliated with the Congress, and the Socialist HMS flatly refused to consider collaboration with the Communists at any level, but the independent UTUC did join hands with AITUC in a cooperative agreement. This slight initial success encouraged the Communists to raise the slogan of "one industry—one union" and to initiate infiltration (united front from below) tactics at the lower union levels.

As the political campaign got under way in 1951 preparatory to India's first general parliamentary elections, the CPI intensified its united front appeal in an effort to forge election alliances with various leftist groups under the slogan of "socialist unity." The Forward Block, a Bombay Marxist group, seconded the party's appeal in May 1951, following which the Communists also succeeded in establishing a "left unity" with the Workers' and Peasants' Party (formed jointly in 1950 by fellow-traveler groups in Hyderabad and Bombay) and with the Left Socialist Group. In Hyderabad also, the Communists formed a local electoral alliance with the Democratic People's Party and the League of Socialist Workers. On the labor front, Ajoy Ghosh, who replaced Rao as party General Secretary in May, appealed for working-class unity under the banner of "one industry, one union, and one union for all."

The election results in early 1952 confirmed the effectiveness of the Communist tactics. By running only a small number of candidates concentrated in the areas of greatest Communist strength, the party, with only 4.45 percent of the national vote, secured 23 seats to become the second party in parliament after the Congress, while the Socialists, with 10.5 percent of the vote, obtained only 12 seats. The results further indicated that the Communists had been particularly successful in the areas of their greatest labor strength—the Punjab, Andhra, Travancore Cochin (now Kerala state), Madras and Bengal.

CPI Labor Gains Since 1952

Since the first general elections, nothing has happened on the international Communist front to force upon the CPI leadership a new shift of policy away from the neo-Maoist united front strategy. On the contrary, Soviet destalinization moves at the 20th CPSU Congress imparted greater flexibility to the Indian party's tactical application of the strategy. Furthermore, despite the momentary confusion in the party caused by *Pravda's* early 1955 eulogy of Nehru as a "Partisan of Peace," the overall effect of the era of cordial Soviet-Indian diplomatic relations heralded by that pronouncement has been to give the CPI an increased popular aura of respectability far outweighing the disadvantages of a decreased freedom of political maneuver as an opposition party.

Nor have the Indian Communists themselves had any cause so far to be dissatisfied with the present party line. Indeed, the Extraordinary Party Congress held at Amritsar in April 1958 fully reaffirmed it with the declaration that the party will strive for "full democracy and socialism by peaceful means." The Congress also affirmed the party's objective of becoming a powerful mass movement which can win a majority in parliament, and the party constitution was revised in keeping with this new "mass" character. The party's directing organs, both central and local, were greatly enlarged, and even their names were changed to give them a more democratic, less conspiratorial flavor. The Politburo is now replaced by a Central Executive Committee, the Central Committee by a National Council, and the old basic party unit—the cell—by "branches."

Aided by the continuity of the party line, the Communists have scored important gains on the labor front since 1952. Some associations of "white-collar" workers —the bank and insurance employees, municipal government workers, and airline employees—have joined the Communist fold. The petroleum workers' union has done likewise. Moreover, there has been a considerable amount of covert Communist infiltration into the ranks

[21] Circular of the CPI Central Committee, issued at the end of 1950 (document in possession of author).

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of the non-Communist directed unions and labor organizations. Thus, although both the Central Government Employees Federation and the Postal Employees Federation are headed by Praja-Socialists, the Communists have actually gained a strong voice in them by joining in the guise of independents.

To a certain extent also, the Communists' persistent waving of the banner of labor unity has produced results. As early as October 1952, the late veteran independent trade union leader, N. M. Joshi, came out in support of a united labor front and proposed that all the national labor organizations merge into one federation. While this did not succeed on the national level, the intense Communist propaganda campaign unleashed at this time proved effective in Delhi state, where many trade unions belonging to AITUC, UTUC, and even HMS joined in forming a combined Trade Union Council. In Bombay also, where HMS had virtually smashed Communist influence in the trade unions, the unity call brought about a noticeable resurgence of Communist strength. This was evidenced by the fact that 10 cotton and 30 silk mills were shut down when the local Bombay CP called for a token strike as a mark of respect on the occasion of Stalin's death in March 1953. It should be added that, since the formation of the Delhi Trade Union Council in 1952, Communist efforts have succeeded in bringing about local joint fronts of AITUC and HMS unions in Calcutta and Kanpur.

Future Portents

The growth of overall Communist political strength was again underscored by the 1957 general elections, when the party emerged victorious in Kerala state and thus earned the right to form the first Communist state ministry in India. Even more important perhaps, were the sizable inroads made by the party in formerly strong non-Communist areas such as the United Provinces and Bihar. In West Bengal, the party secured 18.1 percent of the vote as compared to 10.3 percent in the 1952 elections, and now holds 46 seats in the state legislature as against the Congress Party's 152. It is probably here, because of the chronic unemployment and various deep-seated social ills which afflict West Bengal, that the Communist challenge will be most serious in the immediate future.

There are, however, some significant straws in the wind. For one thing, the omnipresent signs of growing Communist strength, coupled with the example of what has happened in Kerala under Communist rule, have shattered the complacency of the ruling Congress Party. In a December 1958 statement, Deputy Minister of Labor Abid Ali labeled the Communists as "dangerous elements in democracy," [22] while Govinda Menon, the former Chief Minister of Travancore Cochin (now Kerala), has aptly characterized the Communist administration there as "a government of the party, by the party, and for the party."

Another striking portent is that, whereas Communist influence has been gaining elsewhere in India, the party has been losing ground in Kerala where it is the ruling power. This has been evidenced by recent strikes in the cashew and coir industries and the plantations there, and by the fact that the local INTUC and HMS labor organizations have been regaining their lost prestige and have formed a "united front" of their own to resist Communist political pressure. It is edifying that the Kerala Ministry, to break this resistance, has permitted armed Communist brigades to attack peaceful trade union gatherings, with a loss of 20 workers' lives, and to fire upon workers' processions. Indeed, Communist Chief Minister E. M. S. Nambudripad has even threatened "civil war," if necessary, to keep his regime in power.[23]

The Kerala Communist leader's warning cannot be dismissed lightly in view of his high position in the central CPI hierarchy. Above all, it is a timely reminder that Indian communism's "peaceful parliamentary road to socialism" will be followed only so long as it continues to be effective in achieving or holding on to power—and, to be sure, as history shows, only so long as it conforms to the higher interests of Moscow and Peking.

[22] *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, December 16, 1951.

[23] *Ibid.*, July 13, 1958.

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The Factory Manager in Soviet Fiction

By George Gibian

EDITORS' NOTE: Why has the publication of Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* aroused such tremendous curiosity throughout the world? The answer seems self-evident: because of Pasternak's unique stature in the Soviet literary world; because of the book's implicit and even explicit criticism of Soviet dogma, and its consequent suppression in the author's own country; and finally because of the dramatic events surrounding the award of the Nobel Prize to Pasternak and his forced rejection of it. Yet there is another less obvious but perhaps more profound reason for the extraordinary furor: for the first time in over two decades, (specifically, since the publication of Sholokhov's *Quiet Flows the Don),* the world has been presented with a book that can be judged almost purely in *literary terms*—that is, as a work of art. It is this quality, unhappily often overlooked, that makes the novel so unique.

With but few other exceptions, Soviet writing has produced nothing to merit a reputation in terms of purely literary achievement. Whether one peruses the "proletarian" novels of the 1920's or the works written in the spirit of "socialist realism"—or, indeed, even most of those works that have attempted (as did Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone)* to deviate from the official esthetic prescriptions—one is invariably struck by their didactic quality, dramatic primitivism, and psychological shallowness.

This is not to say, however, that Soviet novels are of no interest to the foreign reader. Insofar as they illuminate either the values that the Communist Party attempts to imbue in its subjects or—indirectly—the *real* values, thoughts, feelings and attitudes of the 200 million citizens of the USSR, they are important reading. Mr. Gibian's essay, the first of a series, focuses on one aspect of Soviet reality as reflected in recent Soviet fiction. By examining a number of novels, particularly those which appeared during the more "liberal" period of 1956-1957, he sheds light on the actual status and role of one of the most important segments of the Soviet elite—the industrial managers. Future articles will deal with other sectors of Soviet society as reflected in Soviet fiction, including youth, women, peasants, workers, and ethnic minorities.

IN SOVIET RUSSIA the factory director is an important personage. For the majority of Russian industrial workers, he is the highest authority within their range of sight. He exerts a great influence over many aspects of their daily life: job assignments, work quotas, wages, premiums, living quarters. There are men still more powerful than the director, but to the average workers they are likely to be shadowy figures off in the distance, at the "center" in a Moscow ministry or at the territorial Council of National Economy, while the director is physically present at the plant. The fact that his power is circumscribed by local party and union representatives, as well as others, does not essentially affect the principle of "one man responsibility" nor the attitude that the director is the boss. As a character in a recent Soviet novel quips in alluding to the director, there may be three persons to the Trinity, but there is only one God almighty.

To the ambitious young man in industry, the director's job is the highest rung on the ladder of success to which he can aspire in his plant. To the government, the factory director is an essential instrument for the smooth execution of industrial expansion. The party has provided substantial material and intangible incentives to attract capable men into industrial administration and engineering, and the director is the man who heads the administrative "staff," including the chief engineer, design engineer, production engineer, purchasing agent, and so forth.

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Collectively the factory directors are the underpinnings of the managerial or technocratic elite which is represented in varying proportions on the Central Committee and the Presidium of the party; in the opinion of some observers, this element constitutes a faction balancing or opposed to the ideologues and the party *apparatchiks*.

Soviet Literature and Soviet Reality

In Soviet literature, governed as it is by the party directive that themes be drawn from contemporary Russian life, the "production novel" represents a leading genre. It supplies dozens of portrayals of factory directors, describing not only their problems and their behavior at work but how they live, what they think about, how they operate.

The use of fiction as a document about actual conditions in a country is never without its dangers. Fiction is part of the world of imagination, and not necessarily, a picture of reality. One must make various allowances, such as for possible bias on the writer's part and his obligation to comply with official wishes. One also faces the difficulties of sampling: Which authors are to be considered reliable? Which writings are to be selected as representative and "typical," which ignored?

On the other hand, literature has some advantages as a source of information about Soviet life. Whereas Soviet official documents (and some foreign studies of Russian institutions) rely on statistics, generalities, and theories, and are sometimes remote from actual conditions, literary works can offer an intimate view of the society in the detailed plot circumstances and characters which they depict. The function of the novelists' art is to recreate the feeling of concrete situations in life, as well as to convey the thoughts of various characters, who must be rounded, convincing people. The personal qualities of representative types tend to be stressed more than their institutional roles, leaving greater leeway for the conveyance of value judgments. Moreover, in the guise of fiction, through the mouth of a character or by implication, Russian writers can express attitudes which they could not afford to state openly and in their own person.

Literature of the post-Stalin "thaw" interval—roughly 1954-57—is particularly revealing on such facets of Soviet society as industrial management, since during this period writers felt relatively free to express what they thought. If it is remembered that fact and fiction are not completely interchangeable, the works published in these years afford an excellent supplement to such information about the Soviet factory director as is available from other sources.[1]

The factory directors of Russian novels fall into two basic categories: the bad, or "negative" type; and the good, or model administrator. The remarkable agreement among the writers on what constitutes virtue and vice in a director makes it possible to construct composite portraits of the two types. The present account will draw on several recent works, but primarily on Galina Nikolaeva's novel, *Battle on the Way* (1957), with its bad director, Valgan, and Bakhirev, the good engineer who eventually replaces him.[2]

The Bad or "Stalinist" Director

The evil director of recent Soviet fiction is remarkable first of all because he has all the earmarks of success. The reader usually meets him at the peak of his power or while he is still on his way upward. He has the reputation of being an outstanding director and everything in his factory is reputed to be going very well. Then, somewhat later, the reader begins to see the other side of the picture: what the true situation is and what his methods are. A battle then ensues between the director and his antagonist, the hero of the piece, usually over some question of production technique or industrial management. After a few initial victories, the director is defeated and exposed. Finally the full extent of his villainy is laid bare.

In the three best, most provocative, and most discussed novels of the period between 1954 and 1957, *The Thaw*, *Not by Bread Alone*, and *Battle on the Way*, we find cast as villains men who appear to be typical successes of Soviet Russian life—self-made men, forceful captains of industry. Ehrenburg's Zhuravlyov, Dudintsev's Drozdov, and Nikolaeva's Valgan are three men belonging to the new technological intelligentsia which Stalin created to carry out the country's rapid industrialization. On the surface they are Soviet Horatio Algers. They, their assistants, and their plants are awarded special premiums, banners, decorations. Yet

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[1] The best accounts are in David Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR*. Columbia University Press, New York 1954, and Joseph S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957.

[2] Quotations in this article have been translated by the writer from the following Russian texts: Galina Nikolaeva, *Bitva v puti*, (Battle on the Way), published in *Oktyabr*, March-July 1957; Vera Panova, *Kruzhilikha*, published in *Znamya*, November-December 1948; Ilya Ehrenburg, *Ottepel* (The Thaw), Moscow, 1956.

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the novelists do not hold out these factory managers for our admiration, but rather unmask them and declare them dangerous and evil. What are the true characteristics of these men which account for the authors' attitudes towards them?

First it must be noticed that the devils are given their due. They work hard and have risen to the top at least partly on their merits. They are good engineers who excel at driving the men under them to work as strenuously as they do themselves. These are truly the "builders," the "ants" working industriously at the expansion of Russian economic might. It is made clear that such men had their finest hour during the war, when they put pressure on everybody, tightened the screws, and squeezed the last drop of effort out of their men and themselves.

Their next important trait is partly a function of their skill as production men and partly a negative trait: they are hard. They have no pity for others or for themselves. Their hearts are as calloused as their hands. From their single-minded eagerness to succeed as industrial tycoons stem a number of vices and abuses, each one worse than the next, culminating in serious crimes. The energy of these men makes bullies out of them. They shout at their inferiors; they do not hesitate to strike them. Valgan in particular is tyrannical. They are all inhuman, robot-like, monstrous.

The Art of Deception

The bad directors are masters at manipulating the official as well as the informal intricacies of Soviet factory management. Not content with legitimate successes in fulfilling production quotas, and adept at swimming in the murky oceans of the Soviet system of incentive rewards, they cheat and deceive wherever possible. They put their own record first and everything else second. They want desperately to mark up the highest figures for their factory where they will count most: in production results. Thus Zhuravlyov pours all capital into expansion of productive capacity, ignoring the crying need for housing for his workers. An apartment construction project has been authorized, the funds have been appropriated, but Zhuravlyov postpones it year after year, since he prefers to see the curve of industrial production go up and a new shop opened, rather than to have his men move out of thei- filthy and unsafe quarters. This is the eventual cause of his downfall. A storm tears down the workers' hovels and Zhuravlyov's neglect is publicly exposed. He is removed as manager of the factory.

Valgan is so eager for honors and rewards that he permits a certain tractor model to be submitted for a Stalin prize, although he knows that several such tractors have suffered the same serious and dangerous accident, proving a defect in their construction. True accomplishment (production, efficiency, quality) interests him less than its appearance (premiums, awards, prizes, paper overfulfillment of the plan). He proves this when he is asked how the production of the tractor is coming by answering with reference not to the actual facts of production progress, but to the official reaction to his reports: "It is coming as it should. . . . The Committee on Stalin prizes has already given its preliminary approval." Later he does all he can to cover up the defect in the model. He refuses to change the design or to recall the tractors already being operated in the field, although they are endangering the lives of innumerable drivers.

Valgan wants none of his subordinates to offer productive ideas or receive favorable publicity unless it is made clear that the ultimate responsibility—and credit—are the director's. When a young worker, without authorization from Valgan, develops a new technique for speedier production, Valgan, far from rejoicing over the gains to his factory and the Soviet economy, illegally punishes the young man by assigning him to work where pay is small and the assigned quota very high, so that premiums for surpassing the norm are impossible to earn. The young man protests that according to regulations, anyone who invents a speedier method of work is to be rewarded by being kept for six months on his previous production quota, so that he can reap the benefit of extra income by easily surpassing his old norm. Valgan agrees that such regulations exist, but says that no rule prohibits the transfer of the man to a different job.

In numerous ways the bad factory director evades the goals and the spirit of economic legislation while observing the letter; at times he breaks even the letter of the law. Such a director never wishes to change to a new model or to switch to an unexpected line of production, since it is easier and more profitable in fulfillment percentages to continue manufacturing the old model; a change of product demands expenditure of time, material and labor. In Sofronov's *Moscow Character,* the factory director refuses to introduce a superior textile machine because he would have to interrupt the established production of the old models with which he can overfulfill his plan. Drozdov in *Not By Bread Alone* for years suppresses a superior pipe-casting machine.

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By the same token, directors are averse to manufacturing spare parts. The nation's economy may be crying for spare parts (as we know from other sources), but production of whole units, of large machines, is much more spectacular on a factory's record of accomplishments and brings in premiums. Typical is the attitude of Listopad, in Vera Panova's *Kruzhilika:*

Better than any other engineer, he, a peasant himself, understands what tractor spare parts mean for the postwar Soviet economy. But still, why does it have to be exactly his plant that has to undertake this kind of unimpressive production? Perhaps some other plant will get stuck with it. Please God that this cup may pass him by. And he will turn out machines of decisive importance in the present grand postwar construction: machine tools, excavators, power saws.

Factory directors, not content to let the actual record speak for itself, pad their production figures. They cut corners left and right to gain extra premiums and "good marks" for themselves. Valgan, for example, used artificially lowered norms of production in his records and towards the end of reporting periods listed as "assembled" tractors which actually were not yet completed. In reporting the quantity of defective goods produced, he illegally subtracted from the total the "legal" percentage, or quantity of spoilage permitted in his production plan. Through these tricks he "overfulfilled" the plan.

Necessary Evil

Soviet novelists give us a glimpse into the world of industrial *blat,* the slang term given to the shadowy, marginal, sometimes illegal, sometimes merely informal set of personal relations, reciprocal favors, gifts, log-rolling, "pull," which serve as the safety valve and as the lubrication of the otherwise tightly controlled and planned economy:

The tool and model shops were Valgan's "fund for exchange." Here they were helping out the railroad people by manufacturing machine tools so that the latter on their part would help out [Valgan's people] by giving them transportation ahead of their turn. Here they were carrying out orders of the ministry outside of the plan. They were giving priority to manufacturing equipment for the metallurgical plant, so that they would receive metal from that plant ahead of schedule.

The authors do not seem to be attacking *blat* as intrinsically evil. They seem on the contrary resigned to it as inevitable and perhaps even useful. But they attack it when it involves neglect and concealment of

A MANAGER'S VIEWPOINT

Рисунок Л. ГЕНЧА.

— Почему у вас вентиляция не работает!
— У нас и так везде дует.
— Так вы бы стекла вставили.
— Что вы! Тогда вентиляцию чинить придется.

—How come your ventilation doesn't work?
—In our place it blows everywhere anyhow.
—Well, why don't you install some glass?
—Come now! Then we'd have to install ventilation.
—From Krokodil (Moscow), Sept. 20, 1957.

intolerable conditions—when *it is* a screen for disorder and chaos:

Enough *blat!,* Bakhirev thought to himself. Our own machine tools are catastrophically neglected and we repair machine tools, outside of the plan, for other people. It is time to apply strict norms of technical accounting.

One of the director's weapons is "the silent treatment":

The terrible condition of our machine tools is given the silent treatment. The silent treatment: that is the knight on Valgan's chess-board: it jumps over the danger spots and covers vulnerable places.

Even the party representative in the plant supports Valgan in his *blat* management. Bakhirev, the critic of Valgan, says to the party man, Chubasov:

In your opinion there is no catastrophic situation in our plant; in my opinion there is. You and Valgan keep silent about it. I am not going to keep silent about it.

Chubasov answers:

Nobody is keeping silent about anything. You are leading the plant to disaster. If we refuse the railroad order, they won't give us outside-of-plan loading. When Valgan says

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that we are hauling freight by loading it on our good relations with the railroad, he is correct.

Bakhirev replies with indignation that Chubasov is the *partorg* yet even he puts up with *"blatmeysterstvo"*. But Chubasov answers that what Bakhirev calls *blatmeysterstvo* is merely "reciprocal obligations, agreements." Later developments in the novel prove that Bakhirev was correct. The factory is on the verge of disaster; production and particularly quality are breaking down. "The machine shop is turning out spoiled castings because they have become accustomed to working without regard to the proper tolerances." *Blat* was Valgan's desperate measure to prevent the disclosure that his methods were ruining the plant.

STILL MORE villainous than their breaches of economic regulations are the bad directors' brutal ways of dealing with people. As power-mad and sometimes desperate men, they use any means to impose their will. Naturally they take advantage of the special opportunities available to them in the conditions of Soviet life. They readily impute evil political motives to their adversaries. At the drop of a hat they accuse their enemies of "economic sabotage." When Zhuravlyov wishes to combat the bothersome engineer, Sokolovsky, he takes advantage of the fact that Sokolovsky's wife had left him years before, married a foreigner, and lives with Sokolovsky's daughter in Belgium. Zhuravlyov insinuates that naturally one cannot fully trust a person with "connections" and relatives abroad. Some rivals are disposed of by being "framed" and sentenced to years of imprisonment in labor camps.

At conferences, an important part of the life of the industrial bureaucracy, the bad directors are skilled in packing committees, depriving their opponents of opportunities to speak, and presenting their own cases as favorably as possible, even if fraudulently. They are usually eloquent orators. The sparkling polish of their rhetoric is regarded by the Russian novelists as a sinister sign of their outward veneer and inner worthlessness. When they are in serious trouble, they lose their composure and oratorical skill.

Their final unmasking frequently takes place at a special meeting attended by various officials and representatives of both sides—the fallen angels and their successors. In such situations, the evil factory director, confronted with the accusations made against him, usually falls back on the tactics which worked in the past. He makes a show of openness by admitting trivial offenses, but tries to cover up for serious charges. Then he turns to boasting. When that does not work and he finds himself with his back to the wall, he reveals the basic cowardliness of the bully: he panics, doublecrosses his associates, and is completely disgraced. Such, for example, is the shameful conclusion of Valgan's career.

The Good or Ideal Director

At the other end of the spectrum the model director's motivation is supremely idealistic. He loves his work, his factory, and the collective effort toward a better future for him and his fellow citizens. However zealous his attitude toward his responsibilities, when a choice has to be made between serving the interests of the country as a whole and those of his own plant and personal prestige, he will give preference to the former. Thus Bakhirev did not hesitate to expose the defect in the tractor his plant was producing, and even to write letters to higher authorities explaining why the model was unworthy of a Stalin prize, although he was thereby jeopardizing his own position in the factory and incurring the anger of his fellow workers, as well as sacrificing his own share of reflected glory from the prize. Self-sacrifice is as natural to the good director as self-interest is to the bad one.

Modesty is an outstanding characteristic of Bakhirev. He never mentions to coworkers that earlier in his career he had covered himself with glory; when the fact is discovered, there is general astonishment at Bakhirev's self-abnegation.

The selflessness of his love for the factory is shown when he is removed, at Valgan's instigation, from his positions as chief engineer and prefers to stay on at the plant in a lowly job, rather than to move to another factory. The ideal Soviet administrator's devotion to his factory is described by Bakhirev's creator with an image drawn from art:

He saw the enormous possibilities of the factory as vividly as an artist sees the painting which he has not yet painted but which he has already thought out in all its details.

It is no wonder that the ideal director loves his factory with the noble enthusiasm of an artistic soul, when even the imperfect director, Listopad, is described by Vera Panova as having identified himself with his enterprise in the following manner:

Some people work and sacrifice something personal, they fulfill their duty. . . . They fulfill it gladly, readily, understanding the goal—and still every minute one feels that they are thinking, "I am doing my duty." But people like Listopad do not sacrifice anything, they do not consider it a duty,

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they do not even think about duty, they are organically, almost physically, fused with their work. You understand, the success of their work is their personal success, its failure is their personal failure, and not through considerations of their career, but because outside of their work there is no life. You understand, for others there is such a thing as a Five-Year Plan for the plant; for him, it is five years of his own life, his fate, his vital interest; it is his entire goal, his passion, his scale of values, his excitement, his whole scope.

The drive and devotion to technology which characterize fictional directors, both good and bad, surely indicate the predominance of these traits in many factory administrators in real life, and probably go a long way toward explaining the marked advances achieved in Soviet industrial expansion.

Still Waters, Stout Hearts

The good director is usually a quiet, unprepossessing man. He does not make a brilliant first impression. Bakhirev, for example, spends a long time after arriving at the plant just walking around, observing, noting things, talking to workers. People begin to think that he is passive and weak. But the author's intention is to show that here is a thorough man who looks before he leaps. After he has made a complete study of the plant, Bakhirev goes to work quietly, honestly, and efficiently.

The good director is often at first considered a little aloof, proud, not sociable. Later, however, everyone comes to appreciate the sterling qualities which underlie his reserved exterior.

Eloquence is another quality lacking in the good directors. They are awkward in speech-making. What they say is brief, based on facts, supported by solid statistics—but not brilliant in manner of presentation. The authors praise them for being quiet men of action who can be trusted. It seems as if Soviet writers were weary—and afraid—of the opposite type, the brilliant, impressive, self-assertive leader.

The warm humanity of the good factory director is stressed by Russian writers. Just as Tolstoy a hundred years ago tried to show that the Russian general Kutuzov was superior to the callous Napoleon because he could be easily moved, could weep for human suffering, and was still interested in women in spite of his advanced age, so Russian novelists today emphasize the humanity of those administrators whom they admire by underscoring their human qualities. The good directors are compassionate. Bakhirev, unlike Valgan, is unable to take refuge in consoling statistics when human lives are at stake. When a tractor driver has been killed because of faulty design, Bakhirev is revolted to find the fact camouflaged in an official report by the antiseptic statement, "The percentage of failures to total production is insignificant." To the ideal factory director, a human life is never "insignificant."

The good directors like children and are liked by them. Also, quite contrary to the puritanical norms of Stalinist literature, they frequently have affairs, even with married women. In contrast, the inhumanity of the bad directors is shown by their inability to have a healthy emotional life. Often their wives run away from them; for example, the wife of Dudintsev's Drozdov leaves him to become the mistress of his rival, Lopatkin.

The novelists portray their ideal administrators as men who learn to steer a middle course, avoiding both excessive nonconformism and excessive yesmanship, who combine the qualities of a courageous individualist fighting for his convictions with those of a disciplined teamworker.

The ideal administrators, furthermore, must learn the delicate distinction between necessary criticism and malicious fault-finding *(zlopykhatelstvo)*. Bakhirev and others denounce the deficiencies which they see around them; the Valgans make serious political accusations against them because of their criticisms. After reading Bakhirev's letter expressing a negative opinion of their tractor, Valgan tells him:

Your oral report is a matter of your own high standards and conscience. But this document is a political document. Here you are emptying the slop-pail over all Soviet tractor construction and exalting foreign makes. That is no longer technology. That is politics. That's how they will look at it.

Bakhirev himself is aware of the ticklish distinction. He says, later, "The cosmopolitans are political faultfinders [*zlopykhateli*]. *I* am not a *zlopykhatel.*" And elsewhere:

I am not maliciously spiteful over our deficiencies. . . . For me our deficiencies are ulcers on my mother's body. When I see them, all I can think of is how to cure them.

He thinks about foreign, competitive economic systems. Russian inferiority in tractor design is to him a spur to greater technological effort. He is aware of the inefficient or self-defeating features of the Soviet economic system. He thinks to himself:

In capitalistic countries there is competition. He who makes bad and expensive things fails and perishes. In our country ruin and failure threaten no one. Does that mean one may produce bad things?

Most Soviet authors are content to rely vaguely on the beneficent workings of idealism for the solution to

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management problems. Galina Nikolaeva, however, seems to think in terms of a combination of idealism and self-interest. Her Bakhirev is a rare man among the creations of Soviet literature: he gives deliberate thought to the problem of building into the Soviet planned economic system devices enlisting self-interest in such a way as to promote efficiency and to frustrate the harmful *blat* methods of Valgan.

The Future of the Directors

An important question remains. Do Soviet authors have anything to suggest concerning the future character of factory directors? Which personality type in their opinion is likely to prevail? It will probably be a year or two before any writers offer versions of the "production novel" under the conditions of Soviet economic decentralization. But the novels which have been examined do suggest at least two significant conclusions.

First, there is as yet little concrete thinking—at least among the authors—about detailed solutions for the problems of technique and procedure in Soviet industry. The books show a clear need for a reform of the system of economic planning, reporting and control, but they supply few positive suggestions. Evidently stronger incentives ought to be provided for the manufacture of spare parts and new products; what seem to be needed are more favorable mechanisms for adjusting planned production goals so as to compensate for the interruption of manufacture when new products are under development. Beyond these measures, the authors have little to suggest. They urge that a superior personality type is needed in management; they wish to stir up the idealism and the alertness of Soviet citizens in order to prevent the Drozdovs, Valgans and their like from occupying—and abusing—positions of authority. Galina Nikolaeva broods over possible ways of enlisting self-interest on the right side. But even she has no concrete suggestion to make; she does not decide where and how such incentives could be applied. The Soviet authors trust vaguely to general idealism, to the effectiveness of the noble intentions of men of good will. They do not translate—and they do not even seem to be aware of the need for translating—these good intentions into concrete, institutionalized machinery which would provide the checks, balances and incentives to steer society in the direction desired.

Secondly, Soviet production novels provide significant evidence linking the personality type of a Valgan with the methods and higher-level personnel of the Stalin era. Galina Nikolaeva, for instance, indicates a correspondence between the evil directors' behavior at the factory level and the Stalinist *modus operandi* on the highest level, in the Kremlin. She explains the rise of evil men as due to their "worship of authority" and "adaptation of their own thinking" to dominant opinions—"to the point of automatism." The heyday of the Valgans was, in short, the heyday of Stalinism. Basically totalitarian tyrannical personality types, they flourished in the atmosphere of political and police terror.

Similarly their fall is related by the writers to "the thaw", the death of Stalin, with which Galina Nikolaeva's novel opens, and the fall of Beria, to which several of them refer as a landmark. They show the Stalinist officials as frightened by the new freedom. One of them panics when he sees the Kremlin opened for visits by common people:

He looked for the customary marble grandeur and saw nothing sculpturesque, monumental. He saw people there. . . . He felt like sounding the warning: people will abuse this ease of access!

The evidence of Russian *belles-lettres* demonstrates that totalitarianism seeped from the Kremlin down to the factories. After 1953, the relaxation in highest quarters is shown to have brought about a humanization and a change of personnel in the plants. By the same token it seems likely that the nature of top-level leadership in the future will continue to be reflected in local industrial management. If the next few years bring more democracy in the Central Committee and Presidium, then we may expect more rational production quotas, and a continued ascendancy of the virtuous, idealistic factory director, whose image appears to be constructed by the Soviet writers from sources combining humanistic values of foreign cultures with the best of the nineteenth-century Russian tradition. If the reverse happens and the Kremlin is restalinized, we may expect Soviet factory directors' offices to be reoccupied by thousands of little Stalins of industry, Drozdovs and Valgans; and the Bakhirevs will have a sorry time of it.

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"Indianizing" Communism

Gene D. Overstreet, Marshall Windmiller:
Communism in India,
Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1959.

Reviewed by G. S. Bhargava

A COMMUNIST PARTY, being at one and the same time an element of the international Communist movement and a part of a national political community, functions not in one environment but in two. In phases of history when the requirements of the two contexts overlap, the party has comparatively smooth political and ideological sailing. Where the situations often clash, as in the case of the Communist Party of India (CPI) during the last 35 years, it is "enmeshed in an exceedingly complex web of influences," blowing hot and cold as the occasion demands. Much has already been written about the fluctuation of Communist strategy in India between a broad support of bourgeois nationalism and a sectarian stress on anticapitalism.[1] The volume under review seeks to identify a new dimension in this dual strategy—the Communist effort to unite the four main classes of the community (the proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie) against, not imperialism, but capitalism itself.

This, however, is not the main claim of the book for serious study. Aside from the fact that it presents a voluminous and well-documented description of developments within the Communism Party of India during the last three decades—a description not equaled in either scope or depth by any volume on the subject hitherto published—the authors put forward a theory (germane, no doubt, to the above suggestion of a new and novel strategy) that an unheard-of "constitutional communism" may emerge in India—put another way, that the CPI may eventually become more "Indian" than "Communist."

To assess the feasibility of such a development, it is necessary to go into the authors' theory in some detail. First, they point out—very correctly—that the CPI is not free of "factionalism based on charismatic leadership," so rampant in Indian politics. But at the same time they do not adequately emphasize that the warring factions within the CPI—ever since the days of M. N. Roy's efforts to win Moscow's recognition for his stewardship of the movement in the 1920's—have actually vied with one another in professing and proving their total subservience to Kremlin dictates.

To cite a more recent instance, in the late 1940's, when B. T. Ranadive was still General Secretary of the CPI, the Andhra faction led by Chandra Rajeshwar Rao crossed swords with him in advocating the application of Chinese strategy to Indian conditions; yet it never said a word against the Cominform policy, which till January 27, 1950, more or less scoffed at the Chinese experiment of a peasant vanguard for the revolution. The attack was concentrated on Ranadive, to whom the international Communist term of blasphemy, Trotskyite, was significantly applied for his alleged faith in individual terrorism. The duality of international loyalty which resulted from the emergence of Peking as an alternative seat of Communist power and prestige—an issue which unfortunately has not been dealt with at all by the authors—will be reverted to later.

THERE HAVE no doubt been occasions when groups of Communists in India either exhibited resistance to policy decisions from Moscow or were slow in toeing the line; these, however, are few and far between and in any event have invariably resulted in Moscow's having its

[1] Cf. Madhu Limaye, *Communist Party: Facts and Fiction,* Chetana Prakashan, Hyderabad, 1951; M. R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India: A Short History,* Derek Verschoyle, London, 1954; and John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India,* Wiley & Technology Press, New York, 1956.

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way. On pages 127-30, the authors discuss in detail, under a categorical sub-title *"CPI vs. Comintern,"* the 1928 All-Indian Conference of Workers' and Peasants' Parties (presided over by Sohan Singh Josh), the decisions of which ran counter to Comintern policy at the time *vis-à-vis* the Indian National Congress and the role of the Indian Communists. But in the same context the authors acknowledge, in a quotation from Philip Spratt, that the Indian Communists had no direct communication with the Comintern "till G. M. Adhikari arrived from Europe in December 1928." [2] Moreover, Stalin was then still engaged in the final stages of his struggle for power: it was only later that the authority of the center *(i.e.,* the Kremlin) over the world Communist movement became absolute and unquestionable. Ultimately, Moscow had its way and the Workers' and Peasants' parties ceased to exist as such.

Another deviation from the Moscow line took place in India in 1941-42, when large numbers of Communists, especially rank-and-filers, were reluctant to swallow the "people's war" theory and to promote the British war effort by abandoning the struggle for national liberation. As pointed out by the authors themselves on page 194, this situation was due to an artificial division in the top echelons of the CPI: the inner core of the leadership was being held in detention and was therefore isolated from instructions from Moscow; the fragment outside prison, led by P. C. Joshi, was wise to the mind of the Kremlin and took to the new line like duck to water. Those in jail, in company with Socialists and left-nationalists, naturally reacted like Indians to the world developments. Above all, so mercurial were the tactics of Stalin toward Nazi Germany that even British Communists, the mentors of CPI, were caught napping when Hitler attacked Russia in 1941. (Harry Pollitt was said to have delivered a speech attacking the war even after Russia had become a party to it). However, after the legalization of the CPI by the British Government and the release of the jailed Communists, the party leadership was again one in toeing the Moscow line.

MORE RECENTLY, when Soviet praise of policies of the Indian Government helped to bring about a thorough Communist debacle in the Andhra elections of February 1955, the CPI leaders assiduously diverted the ire of rank-and-filers from the Kremlin (for its "opportunistic friendship" toward Prime Minister Nehru) by owning their mistake in not acknowledging "the great role" India had been playing "in the world-wide battle for the preservation of peace." [3]

In short, the CPI is "Indian" to the extent Moscow desires it to be and no more. From an idealistic Communist's point of view, the attitude of the Russian leaders toward the Government of India and the role assigned to the CPI in the last seven years may not be conducive to the triumph of communism in India. But when the Kremlin's main aim is to draw India into the Soviet camp in the cold war, when governmental power for the CPI is merely a secondary end, then visualizing the resulting changes in party strategy as processes of the "Indianization" of communism is nothing short of wishful thinking. Has the failure of Communist-sponsored revolutions in many of the Eastern European countries stood in the way of their being sucked into the Soviet orbit? Hasn't the Soviet Army done the job for them?

SINCE 1948, the emergence of China as a potential contender for the control of other Asian Communist parties has had its impact on factionalism within the CPI. But this has not been clearly perceptible because, as John H. Kautsky has put it, "Moscow and Peking have been recommending the same strategy to the Indian Communists" since 1949 [4]—or more correctly, because exploitation of the fund of goodwill created all over Asia for the Chinese revolution has been yielding rich dividends for the Communist cause in the cold war, obscuring the underlying schism within the CPI. The relative importance the Indian Communists have been attaching to front organizations linked with China, such as the India-China Friendship Association, further proves the existence of pro-Peking pressures within the party.

Unfortunately, the authors have overlooked this aspect of factionalism within the CPI. Nor did they assess the likely repercussions in the event of a conflict between Peking and Moscow over the direction of the CPI, an issue to which Kautsky had devoted some space as much as three years earlier. This line of study takes on added importance in the light of certain recent developments such as, first, the gradual cooling off of relations between the Government of India and Peking (with a war of nerves looming large in India's strategic border kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan); second, the

[2] Philip Spratt, *Blowing Up India,* Prachi Prakashan, Calcutta, 1955.

[3] Communique issued by the Central Committee of CPI after its meeting in New Delhi from March 17 to 29, 1955.

[4] Kautsky, *op. cit.,* p. 194.

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Yudin attack on Nehru, evidently sponsored by Peking;[5] and also, the fact that at the 21st Congress of the CPSU in Moscow it was Chou En-lai who set the tone for the speeches of non-Russian Communists.

AS ANOTHER POSSIBLE contributory factor for the emergence of "constitutional communism" in India, the authors refer to the Communist accession to power through parliamentary means in Kerala. Success in Kerala, in their view, has had two important effects:

First, it has opened the prospect of repeating the victory in other states and, in the now imaginable future, at the center; and, second, it has given the Communists who now for the first time enjoy the prestige and perquisites of public office a vested interest in the parliamentary system.

A photograph of the Kerala cabinet also adorns the cover jacket, evidently to suggest the new path ahead of communism in India.

If the method by which power is assumed is the only criterion, Kerala blazes a new trail; otherwise not. The Kerala Chief Minister, E. M. S. Nambudripad, has times without number clarified the current Communist preference for constitutional means as due to the objective situation obtaining in India today, and not as a fundamental change in Communist thinking and approach. In terms of short-term objectives, if a policy of semi-constitutional opposition to the Congress Government, and sweet amiability for Nehru, proves more effective than the crude bombs and acid bulbs from Ranadive's repertoire in keeping India more sympathetic to the Communist *bloc* than to the West in the cold war, why should Communists persist in their past folly? From the long-term point of view also, the present policy seems a quicker vehicle to power. But what happens after Communists achieve power at the center by constitutional means? Hugging their illusion that the Communists will follow in the footsteps of the Congress Party, which two decades ago turned to parliamentary means to "wreck" the Government of India Act of 1935, and which ever since has been functioning constitutionally, the authors overlook the aftermath of the Communist victory in Kerala. The misuse of governmental power to raise funds for the party, the subversion of the civil service, the subordination of even the judiciary to the party apparatus, to mention only a few of the Communist doings in Kerala, do not augur well for the triumph of constitutionalism.

Nor is it correct to say that any group, having attained a share of power, develops a vested interest in the *system* of parliamentary democracy. In the prestige and perquisites of parliamentarianism, yes, but not in the *system* itself. The Soviet Union's vigorous participation in trade and commerce with India, as well as its open wooing of potentially useful elements in the form of free trips, lucrative business deals, juicy jobs, *etc.*, has long since ended the Western monopoly on the use of material blandishments to win over the minds of men. If the Congress Party which is ideologically, organizationally and otherwise ill-equipped for extra-constitutional action, has not developed a real stake in democracy, how can the Communists, simply through a tactical honeymoon with parliamentary institutions, be expected to do so?

IN FURTHER CRITICISM, the authors seemingly have based opinions, in certain instances, exclusively on newspaper sources or biased writings; for example, they state (on page 549) that "though greater working-class and peasant support should be forthcoming because of the (Kerala) Government's land reform measures and, in particular, because of its policy of police non-interference in industrial or agrarian disputes, these and other measures have evidently embittered the business and landed elements and, above all, the large Catholic community." Yet elsewhere in the book, the authors describe the Kerala Government's business dealing with the Birlas, the financiers of the Congress Party, and its efforts generally to keep monied interests in good humor. The Communists are seeking to repeat the success of Kerala in the rest of India not through a bold and radical reform program nor by establishing a record of honest and clean administration, but by a pose of respectability and moderation, along with an appeal to vested interests in all walks of life. While this policy is partly an expression of the current Soviet strategy ordering the alliance of Communists with the national bourgeoisie against imperialism, the greater necessity of influencing India's foreign policy in the direction of friendliness for Soviet Russia is no less responsible for it.

A final word should be said about the authors' chapter on Communist front organizations in India, covering a full forty pages and giving plenty of accurate data about fellow-travellers. But references therein to the Government's efforts to swamp a Communist front like the India-China Friendship Association with its own officials and Congress Party members—and the use of this situation as an additional string to the authors' bow of "constitutional communism"—again suggests a limited vision. If Colonel Nasser has not been able to dominate

[5] See Selig Harrison's article in this issue, p. 27—Ed.

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a front organization like the Asian-African Solidarity Front (to which, incidentally, the authors do not refer at all), to expect Nehru, most of whose time and energy are spent on keeping his heterogeneous party together, to elbow out Communists from the India-China Friendship Association is to live in fool's paradise. In fact, the career of this body will be interesting to watch in the context of fissures developing lately in Indian-Chinese cordiality.

Equally baseless is the authors' optimism regarding the new "democratic" organizational structure of the CPI and the prospect of "more Communists asking more questions in the future." To counterbalance the defection of a handful of David Cohens and Sailen Ghoshs,[6] the CPI has enlisted hundreds of new recruits who are ready to wave the welcome flag and shout the *bhai-bhai* slogans of Soviet-Indian brotherhood whenever the party commands it.

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[6] These were sensitive Communist intellectuals who reacted to Hungary and the 20th Congress by openly venting their disillusionment.

Parties in Decline

John Gates:
The Story of an American Communist,
Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York, 1958.

Henry Pelling:
The British Communist Party,
Adam and Charles Black, London, 1958.

Reviewed by William C. Gausmann

IN HIS "HISTORICAL PROFILE" of *The British Communist Party,* Henry Pelling notes that in the early 1930's Communist leadership was beginning to be recruited from the ranks of the Young Communist League activists, a group of "ambitious young men of working class origin who had never had any other political allegiance than that of international communism". These men lacked the flair which distinguished some of the earlier founders of both the British and American Communist parties—men who had participated in the pre-1917 Left of the trade union and socialist movements either as militants or theoreticians.

John Gates, in telling *The Story of an American Communist,* reveals himself as typical of the brand of party members of which Mr. Pelling speaks—men recruited into Communist parties which were already completely Stalinized. Such people in Britain or the United States are hardly likely to develop into creative thinkers, or to write memoirs brimming with social and political insights. Indeed just why a publisher should have brought out his account one can hardly imagine. Gates himself may have a claim to distinction, his book none.

The son of New York immigrant parents, Gates was a City College student when the Great Depression was at its worst. At the time this municipal college in the heart of Manhattan was a particular target for recruitment efforts by the radical parties. After his father's tiny business collapsed, Gates joined the YCL, "Americanized" his name and was promptly sent to the Middle West to organize unemployed steel workers. Just when a number of such young Communists were finding their way into the new unions, whose growth in America coincided with the Comintern's adoption of the Popular Front policy, Gates went off to fight in Spain. In his absence he was "elected" a member of the YCL's national executive and upon his return to the United States began a 20-year career as a national Communist official. Less than two years after his return from Spain the CPUSA was deprived of its briefly flourishing influence by the Moscow-Berlin pact. Gates was shocked by it, but like most functionaries he stuck to the party. Later, while he was serving as a soldier in the United States army, he was shocked again by the deposing of Earl Browder, the party's general secretary whose "American" orientation Gates subscribed to; yet again he stuck.

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Appointed editor of the *Daily Worker* after the war —as a compromise choice, apparently, between the "hards" and the "softs" in the inner circles of CPUSA leadership—Gates perceived that the party's influence was declining prior to the invocation of legal hindrances to its growth by the US government. However, his sentencing under these curbs to a term in Atlanta penitentiary temporarily saved him from having to think through his doubts about the CPUSA's effectiveness. At the same time, it gave him the first opportunity he had had since leaving City College to read something other than party literature, and he concentrated his attention on American problems. He also contemplated the fact that while civil libertarians like Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and the Socialist leader Norman Thomas, who had been particular targets for Communist abuse, came to his defense, the American people generally (including the workers) were so alienated by the CPUSA that they felt none of the sympathy for him and his comrades which they had extended to radicals of previous generations who had run afoul of the law.

THESE LESSONS of his experience in jail, rather than any basic insights into the nature of the Soviet state machine which he had been serving for well over a decade, seem to have steeled Gates for his fight in 1956-57 to do the impossible—to convert an official Communist daily into a free newspaper. He did manage to print Khrushchev's famous Twentieth Congress "secret speech" and, with the support of his staff, some forthright condemnations of the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising. A resolution reflecting his democratizing views actually passed the CPUSA convention, but was soon rendered a nullity by a politburo which was still dominated by the inevitable, if occasionally strained, alliance between the old "hard" sectarians and the functionaries who depend upon the preservation of essential orthodoxy for their livelihoods. A year ago they closed down Gates' beloved *Daily Worker* and he left the party to write this little book. Other than its next-to-last chapter which documents the last two years of the CPUSA (when membership declined from 17,000 to about 5,000) there is nothing of interest in it—except perhaps to those who will derive some amusement from the superficial rationalizations with which Gates, possibly out of habit, manfully defends most of what the CPUSSR and the CPUSA have done, even while condemning these things as bad in retrospect.

Just how naive the man was, and is, one isn't quite sure. He was in Spain, but he knows nothing about the role of the political commissars. He was at least nominally in the CPUSA's top echelons, but he knows nothing about the party's function as a recruiting agency for Soviet spies. If he is in fact that simple, his accomplishment during his last year on the *Daily Worker* is all the more remarkable, but such naivety can hardly produce a useful analysis of a twenty-year experience.

MR. PELLING'S BOOK on the British Communist Party, on the other hand, is worth reading It provides all the names and dates that one needs to know, as well as some useful insights into the sociology of the CPGB in its several phases.

One is struck by the similarities and the differences between the situations of the American and British Communist parties today. Both are failures—from the point of view either of sinking roots in the political lives of their nations, or of being effective supports to Soviet foreign policy. The political structure of the one country is as hostile to small parties as is the other's. National pride, and the national commitment to democracy is as profound in Britain as in the US. Yet the British party, no matter how weakened, still lives, and the American party is dead. Why?

Not, in the reviewer's opinion, because British Communist leadership has been any more expert than American. William Z. Foster, for example, cuts a bigger figure in American labor history than ever Harry Pollitt did in the British trade union movement. Earl Browder in his Communist days was as considerable a "theoretician" as Palme Dutt, and more readable.

Pelling, perhaps a little too briefly, tells of the first "mass bases" of British communism on the Celtic fringes of the Island, and then in the London area. It would be interesting to know if the increase in Communist strength, particularly in the trade unions, can be traced to the considerable migration of Scottish and Welsh workers to English industrial areas during the depression. And perhaps this conjecture gets to the root of the matter. A Scot or a Welshman may not be an Englishman, but a Scotch or Welsh Communist seems considerably less "foreign" to British workers than a Communist has always seemed to American workers—even to most of those of rather recent immigrant origin. Nor is the doctrine that the Communists have tried to spread as "foreign" to the British worker's thinking as it is to the American's. In a country where, no matter how softened and blurred, class distinctions can hardly escape notice, a radical-sounding socialism is the inevitable political creed of some percentage of the "earnest minority" which determines working class politics. The requirements of social development in Britain have assigned a key role to a more or less socialist Labor Party, while in America the crucial labor

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institution is the trade union. The British situation seems to require (although this may be passing) that the Labor program have something of a theoretical content, to which the Communists can appear to be offering amendments, while in the American situation any endeavors—by Communists or anyone else—to insert ideological politics into trade union life are considered "foreign."

Consequently, even in its present distress the British Communist Party retains a residuum of working class support and tolerance which the American Communists have rarely known. While in both countries the intellectuals and the unhappy "housewife" element have been blown in and out of the Communist parties, in Britain there are "cells" of, superficially at least, ordinary workers who stay in the party, bolstering the vain hopes of the functionaries that one day they will be men of power.

THIS RESIDUAL strength of British communism does not express itself in electoral successes. There hasn't been a Communist member of Parliament elected since 1945, though a few local councillors have survived in South Wales, the Clydeside and London's East End. (One of the latter is currently creating a rumpus within the ranks by opposing prostitution, an attitude with which working class party members generally agree but which strikes pseudo-intellectual party "sympathizers" as "Victorian".) What strength does remain to the Communists is to be found in a handful of union organizations—in a few craft unions, where opposition to technological change is the Communists' stock in trade, and in several districts of the miners' union. Unfortunately Pelling is weak on the industrial history of the CPGB. He gives us the highlights but not enough detail or enough analysis to explain the persistence of Communist union influence, which still catches new party recruits in its swirl.

So long as this influence is there, it is not impossible, as Pelling recognizes, that the British Communist Party might stage enough of a comeback to cause mild embarrassment to a Labor government seeking to pursue a realistic, pro-democratic international policy. Technological change may ultimately deproletarianize British industry and so eliminate the CPGB. Meanwhile, it survives as what Aneurin Bevan has called the "deathwatch beetle" of British politics.

IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES—

The "Time Factor" in Soviet Economic Planning, *by Gregory Grossman*
Soviet-Satellite Economic Coordination, *by Alfred Zauberman*
What Happened to "Collective Leadership"?, *by Merle Fainsod*
Gomulka in Power, *by Zbigniew Brzezinski*
The Nationalist-Communist Symbiosis in the Middle East, *by Joel Carmichael*
The Soviet Middle Eastern Dilemma, *by Walter Z. Laqueur*
Soviet Economic Aid—*article-review by Peter Wiles*

ALSO: Reviews of recent books on Poland by K. A. Jelenski, of recent books on Yugoslavia by D. D. Kostich, and of "popular literature" on the USSR by George Sherman.

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